ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES - Volume 4 Issue 2, August-September 2023

Pages: 113-127

Date of Publication: 30-Oct-2023

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China's Military in the Indo-Pacific Region: Security Implications for India and Its Strategic Partners

Author: Thangavel K Balasubramaniam

Category: Strategic Studies

Abstract:

This article studies China’s Coercive Military Clandestine in the Indo-Pacific Region, which is China’s covert and overt actions in terms of its strategies and offensive- Missile and Naval capabilities against India’s mainland and maritime space. Besides, how the fortifying Island chain strategy of China from South China Sea to Western Indian Ocean region, will be a covert strategic locations to leverage its power projection against India were studied. In addition expansion of its overseas military expedition and coercive offensive capabilities in the indo-pacific region were analysed. Further the defensive capability of India and the United States deployments in South Korea to countermeasure China’s raising missile threats were studied. Finally this study proposes the security implications along with policy prescriptions as inputs for India and its strategic partners: To strengthen India’s strategic countermeasures for strategic autonomy on par with China’s aggressive posture, this study identifies the choke points for strategic locations of China in the Indo-Pacific region. Further military coalitions in the western Indian Ocean region to countermeasures China’s strategy, and combined missile defense program to deter China’s long range ballistic missile threats for regional stability and geostrategic countermeasures were suggested.

Keywords: China's Coercive Clandestine, Belt and Road Initiative, Missile Defense, Indo-Pacific Security, Offensive and Defensive Strategy, Island Chain Strategy

DOI: 10.47362/EJSSS.2023.4203

DOI URL: https://doi.org/10.47362/EJSSS.2023.4203

Full Text:

Introduction

Belt and Road initiative of China comprises the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and Maritime Silk Road, for its trade and energy supply chain from Africa and Middle East countries to China via Indian and Pacific Ocean. Two ocean strategy of China expands impose its balancing power projection capability in the Pacific and Indian Ocean region to secure its sea lines of communication. The 2015, defense white paper of China’s emphasize its ambition’s in maritime power projection beyond East Asian waters. It changes its strategy from “offshore water defense” to “open seas protection” (Singh, 2023). This increases Chinese deployments in the Indian Ocean Region also it speeds up its far seas protection (Rice & Robb, 2021), which is PLAN’s strategies to protect its sea lines of communication and overseas military expedition for both peacetime and wartime missions.

India and its strategic partners opposes China’s hegemonic approach and any form of coercion in the Indo-Pacific region. To Understand the China’s strategy of leveraging power projection capability in the Indo-Pacific region, it is necessary to analyze its strategic establishments, coercive escalation capabilities, construction of ports, military engagements and weaponization in the strategically located countries. Raising China’s military power and its strategy is a growing concern for a potential confrontation between Western Powers, Pacific Countries, and India on the one side and China on the other side. India shares its long territories with China and centered its maritime power projection and posture in the Indian Ocean Region. China expands its overseas military expedition; by contrast, India shows its immediate priority is in the Indian Ocean. For the larger framework, India as a significant player has to play geostrategically to raise its strength in the Indo-Pacific region against China’s aggressive posture.

U.S. in Indo-Pacific

By virtue of its geography U.S. positioned in Atlantic and Pacific powers, and expand its alliance from Pacific to Indo-Pacific region. U.S. uses Forward-deployed diplomacy in the Asia and Pacific region for its commitment to support economic, political, regional peace, bilateral ties and maritime security to the counties in this region (Clinton, 2010), but its operational concept Indo-Pacific is remains a moot. U.S. encourages Free and Open Indo- Pacific (FOIP), to maintain global trade, economy, and regional security. Besides U.S. has naval bases and military presence in the Indo-Pacific region, Camp Lemonnier in Africa, Diego Garcia in Indian Ocean, Australia, Four bases in Philippines: Camilo Osias in Santa Ana, Cagayan; Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Gamu, Isabela; Balabac Island in Palawan; and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan (U.S. Department of Defense, 2023), Camp Humphreys in South Korea and Torii Station Army Base in Okinawa, Japan.

France in Indo-Pacific

France’s 93 percentage of Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is located in Indian and Pacific Ocean (Embassy of France, n.d.). To protect its citizens, overseas territories and EEZ, France contributes to the security of regional areas by promoting military and security cooperation. In 2021-2022, France hold the presidency of the Indian Ocean Commission, which develop regional cooperation in the areas of maritime security, the environment, the economy, student mobility, response to natural disasters and synergies with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (France Diplomatie, n.d.). India and France have bilateral cooperation in defense, security, maritime cooperation, develop defense industrial capabilities in India, regional peace and economic growth. Also both the countries committed to free, open, inclusive, secure and peaceful Indo-Pacific region (Ministry of External Affairs, 2023).

Canada in Indo-Pacific

Canada is a Pacific country, shares 25,000 kms of Pacific coastline and it has robust trading relationships across the region and people-to-people ties. Also it engages in more diplomatic, economic, military and technical support and cooperation to the countries in Indo-Pacific region. In addition Canada support to deepen a variety of partnerships, supports a rules-based approach to a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Indo-Pacific region. China factor in Indo-Pacific pushes Canada’s approach in bilateral, regional and multilateral with the countries in Indo-Pacific region. Further it invest in building capacity to engage with countries across the region such as Australia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, China, India, Japan, Pacific Island Countries, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand, to Promote peace, resilience, security,prosperity of economy and stability. Any instability in this region will directly impact the safety, prosperity and security of Canada. India is a Canada’s critical partner in Indo-Pacific region, because of its strategic position, trade, economy and security role in both regional and global arena. (Global Affairs Canada, n.d. )

Israel in Indo-Pacific

The Israel and U.S. have shared interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean. Iranian expansion in the Indian Ocean and its attempt to closing the Strait of Hormuz, threatens the U.S.’ ability to control over blockade China in this region, as well this perturbs American sea lines of communication running from the Near East to the Western Pacific. In this concern, Israel and the U.S. have a clear joint interest in ensuring their control over the Eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean against Iran. Israel could benefit from the ability to pressure Iran from the Indian Ocean. U.S. Navy’s presence in the Arabian Gulf allows Israel’s freedom of action over land and naval forces to act more independent in this region. However India depends more on energy imports from Iran through this region. Though Israel is not directly confront any Chinese engagement in Indian Ocean region, India, Israel, and the U.S. would all benefit from maritime space in this region (Halem, 2018).

China in Indo-Pacific

China’s raising coercive activity in the Indo - Pacific Region perturbs the status quo by its strategy, nuclear and missile capabilities to deter its nuclear capable adversaries such as India, Japan, Australia, and the western power presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Establishing expeditionary assets from Africa to South China is a key priority for China to secure its Sea Lines of communication (SLOC) for regional and global strategic concern. To establish maritime connectivity, over the last decade, China financed 35 ports around the world, out of which 14 ports are located in the Indian Ocean Region, and three ports are located in the Pacific Ocean (Abi-Habib, 2018). The constructed dual-purpose ports will be leveraged as a naval base in the conflict-prone region to contain its adversaries in the Indo - Pacific Region of China.

India is a potential adversary in the Indian Ocean region against Chin’s aggressive posture, it plays a vital role as a net security provider to the countries in this Region. But concerning the national security of India, Indian Ocean security architecture cannot neglect the dynamics of China in the Indo-Pacific pivot, and its maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean to secure its SLOCs (Kapur, 2019). The prime priority of India’s maritime interest beyond the Indian Ocean into the Southern Pacific, East, and South China Sea varies by its geostrategic importance for deterrence.

But China’s maritime interest, expands far away from its territory with almost equal priority to drive its Belt and Road Initiative and to establish maritime expedition in the Indo-Pacific region, by raising its military ties and diplomatic relations with major island nations and littoral countries around the Indian and Pacific Ocean region (Singh & Kapur, 2020). In addition, China increases its missile and naval capabilities with military strategies for offensive and defensive activities to contain its adversaries in the Indo-Pacific region. (Balasubramaniam & Murugesan, 2020).

For the past decade, China raised its investment to construct ports and jointly developed naval vessels with the countries encompassing India. Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, Gwadar deep water port in Pakistan and Chittagong port in Bangladesh, Kyaukpyu deep water port in Myanmar (Butt & Siddiqui, 2021) and initiated iHavan project in the Maldives (Putten & Meijnders, 2015). China’s presence in Sri Lanka and Chittagong are highly geo - strategically vulnerable to India, where China can move its fleet near India’s sphere of influence in the Southern and North Eastern part of India. To deter China’s aggressive geostrategic posture in the Indo-Pacific region QUAD as India’s security partners in the East, with Japan, Australia and United states were in position to interdict China’s aggressive posture in the Pacific region. Also India’s Act East policy strengthens India’s strategic relations and security cooperation’s with Southeast Asia, which bolster India’s position as regional power, to contain any aggressive posture. But in the west of the Indian Ocean region, China’s strategy need to be balanced by India as a security partner to strategically located countries in terms of military coalitions, capacity building, providing defense equipment supports and bilateral defense engagements, which maintains regional power balance in the western Indian Ocean region. Besides thriving China’s interest in the western and southern part of Africa will be coercion for the countries in the Atlantic region. This will be a deterrence for India’s strategic partners, Canada and United States, where their borders stretches from Pacific to Atlantic Ocean.

India in Indo-Pacific

On par with China’s coercive strategic establishments, India maintains its diplomatic relations and military ties with the strategic located countries in the Indo-Pacific region as a soft power. It has military and security ties with Africa, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman in the Middle East countries, Israel, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Maldives, SriLanka, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam, Philippines, Australia, South Korea, Japan, U.S. and Russia. But concerning China factor in Indo-Pacific, India and its strategic partners excludes Russia’s military coalition, to confront China’s aggressive posture in the Indo-Pacific region.

China’s Coercive Offensive Capability in the Indo-Pacific Region

Indeed, China’s third aircraft carrier, the Type 003 is under construction, as the United States Naval Intelligence expects it to enter the service by 2024. In 2020, PLAN’s submarine inventory contains 58 submarines, of which 48 are SSK-Diesel-electric power submarines, and 10 are nuclear-powered submarines. Out of which, four Jin-class (Type-094) SSBNs can carry 12 JL-2 nuclear-armed Submarine Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and have a strike range of 7,400 km. PLA (N) consistently engages in constructing nuclear submarines; it is expected to operate the Type 094 and Type 096 SSBNs concurrently and could have up to eight SSBNs by 2030 (Congressional Research Service, 2023). Also, China deployed Dong Feng 41 (DF-41) ICBM with a range of 12,000km to 15,000 km, capable of carrying 10 Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) with a conventional or nuclear payload. In addition, China plans to increase nuclear warheads, including Submarine - Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (SLBM) JL-3 (Janes, 2020). The endeavor of the Indian Navy’s aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya, is capable of challenging PLAN’s Liaoning aircraft carrier (Indian Navy, 2022). India Navy commissioned the first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant, which bolsters the Indian Navy’s position in IOR against PLAN’s naval coercion (Ministry of Defence, 2022). Indeed, India needs to raise its naval capability to contain the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indo-Pacific region; also, it envision to develop its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to strengthen its blue-water naval capabilities.

Moreover, China deployed a DF-26 intermediate - range Anti - Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) for conducting conventional or nuclear strikes within the range of 4,023 KM (Kazianis, 2016). DF-21 and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles deployed to South China Sea successfully hits moving target in the south of Paracel Islands (Congressional Research Service, 2023). The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) tested the DF-17 MRBM for carrying the DF-ZF (HGV) to deliver both conventional and nuclear payloads, which are capable of penetrating aircraft carriers (Wood & Cliff, n.d.). This wide spectrum of missile developments is a critical enabler for inherently developing coercive escalation and belligerent threats to India and its strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific region.

In status quo, the United States in the Indo-Pacific region is capable of intercepting Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) at the midcourse phase. Any belligerent missile threats in East Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, are surge to protect by U.S. missile defense systems deployed in South Korea; Patriot interceptor, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems. Additionally its multi-kilowatt laser and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capable ships armed with the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor will defend and protect against China’s ballistic missile threat to Pacific region as well U.S. mainland. On par with China’s rising missile capability, India is capable to defend any belligerent ballistic missile threats from China with its endo-atmospheric Advanced Air Defense (AAD) interceptor and Exo-Atmospheric Prithvi Air Defense (PAD), which are capable of intercepting the hostile ballistic missile at the terminal phase of flight. But to defend long-range Ballistic Missiles with maneuvering glide nuclear warheads, midcourse interception is much safer to avoid countermeasure issues at the terminal phase. To defend against hypersonic ICBM and nuclear-capable IRBM, it is appropriate for India to develop Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) and boost phase interceptors along with direct energy weapons. India developed Short range, Medium range, Intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles to secure its mainland, maritime domain and for deterrence. And is self-reliant in developing short range ballistic missile defense. Its missile inventory developed by DRDO for national security and deterrence are given below (Table 1).

Table 1: Missiles of India

Missiles Developed in India by DRDO	Capabilities
Agni-I	Short range ballistic missile with operational range of 700-900km
Agni-II and Agni Prime	Medium range ballistic missile, nuclear capable, with operational range of 2000km
Agni-III	Intermediate range ballistic missile, nuclear capable range-3500 km
Agni-IV	Intermediate range ballistic missile, nuclear capable range- 4000 km
Agni-V	Inter-continental ballistic missile, surface to surface ,nuclear capable with strike range over 5000 km.
Akash	Short range surface-to-air missile, Endo atmospheric air defense
Trishul	Short range, low level Surface-to-air missile
Dhanush	Short range,ship launched ballistic missile
Prithivi variant’s	Short range, tactical surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile with ranges of 150km ,250km, 350 km
K variant’s	Submarine launched ballistic missile with maximum range of 3500 km
K-100	Air-to-Air medium range missile with range of 300km
Pralay	Canister launched tactical, surface-to- surface missile with range of 150-500 km
Shaurya	Short range submarine launched ballistic missile(SLBM) with range of 750km
Prahaar	Short range, tactical surface to surface ballistic missile with range of 150 km
Pranash	Short range, tactical surface to surface ballistic missile with range of 200 km
Astra	Air- to -Air missile with range of 80 km
Nirbhay	Subsonic cruise missile with range of 1000km
BrahMos (DRDO and NPOM Russia)	Supersonic cruise missile, capable of launch from land, Sea and Air. Variants are developed for Anti-Ship and Land-Attack roles.

Source: Compiled by author

Expansionist Strategy of China in the Western Indian Ocean

China expands its western Indian Ocean expedition and intends to build overland routes connecting China via Central Asia to transport energy resources from Gulf and the Middle Eastern countries. The Energy lifeline follows Gulf-Pakistan-Xinjiang. The Gwadar port in Southern Pakistan acts as a point for offloading oil imports from the Middle East and then transporting them to China through railway and land routes (Simon, 2013). Distance from Kashgar in western china to Gwadar port is only 1500 km which is easy for transporting energy from Middle East and Persia gulf to China, this will be an alternate strategical route to Malacca strait, which connects Indian and Pacific Ocean. In addition China decided to build its second overseas naval base in Jiwani, near Gwadar port, in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, to protect its SLOC and for geostrategic planning. Also, China invested in developing an all-weather road at Karakoram Range which pass through Gilgit-Baltistan, the de facto border in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). China conducted joint China-Pakistan Shaheen Air Force exercises with various combat operations and it continued to develop air and naval base on Pakistan’s western coast, it increase its military diplomacy with Pakistan, and there is a mutual transfer of technology between the two countries Pakistan expedite China’s missile program through the transfer of Tomahawk missiles, reverse engineering helped China create its air-launched KD-20 cruise missile and the ground-launched DH-10 cruise missile. Then China helped Pakistan to develop its Babur missiles by using this technology. Moreover, China helped Pakistan to develop nuclear weaponization, bomb designs, development of high-explosive components, and nuclear weapons delivery capabilities, Pakistan’s Airforce Navy and army were highly supported by China in terms of providing equipment and technology transfer. In the future, China will leverage Pakistan for power projection in the Indian Ocean region (Lalwani, 2023).

In addition, China supports Pakistan’s missile development program by providing an optical tracking system (Chen, 2018). In May 2020 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incursion into Indian-controlled territory with its troops at several standoff locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC); for rapid support, it deployed reserve forces from Tibet and Xinjiang to the interior part of western China. In June 2020, an attack in the Galwan Valley by the PLA caused the death of 20 Indian soldiers (Department of Defense, 2021). India found distrust of China even after the 2021 disengagement plan was executed to maintain peace at the LAC, and this forced India to retain its large military presence at LAC in Ladakh; during this security crisis, India deployed around 50,000 soldiers to the eastern part of Ladakh to contain China along with battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers, surface-to-air missiles, and brand-new Rafale multirole fighters to resume peace in Ladakh, apart from the crisis as a peacetime strength Indian Army traditionally deploys its one infantry division in Ladakh (Tarapore, 2021). LAC in Ladakh with China and Pakistan are the most strategic vulnerabilities for India.

China increased its presence in the African continent for its geoeconomic interest as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (Risberg, 2019). According to a government study on Chinese African economic and trade connections, China has established 25 economic and trade cooperation zones in 16 African countries and has continued to invest substantially across the continent throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. End of 2020, 623 enterprises were registered with China's Ministry of Commerce, with a total investment of USD 735 billion (Secretariat of the China Africa Economic and Trade Expo, 2021). China continues to invest heavily its two third of its total investments in more than 12 nations in the East African Region of the Western Indian Ocean, especially in Ethiopia and Eritrea; Ethiopia serves as a hub for China's Belt and Road Initiative, a growing initiative aimed at expanding Chinese influence through financing and building infrastructure in underdeveloped countries. Approximately 400 Chinese building and manufacturing projects worth over $4 billion are underway in Ethiopia. The Chinese are responsible for much of Ethiopia's air, road, and rail infrastructure (Sany & Sheehy, 2022).

Eritrea, a country in North-East Africa, has inked an agreement with China to join the Belt and Road Initiative and followed suit like Ethiopia; on November 25, 2021, the two countries signed a Memorandum of Understanding officially. Massawa and Assab are two magnificent natural harbors in Eritrea, which are strategically significant since it has access to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and Europe, as well as the Arabian Gulf and the Western Indian Ocean (Ellis, 2021). Besides its military base in Djibouti, China decided to establish a new Military base in Equatorial Guinea (ANI, 2022) which will be a coercive choke point for northern Atlantic Ocean access, this raises maritime security concerns for India and its strategic partners in the western Indian Ocean region and beyond. China’s interest in Africa is not only for its natural resources but to establish its overseas military bases for geostrategic planning and military objectives. On Par with China, India holds is strategic position in the African continent, Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) by India, Japan, and multiple African Countries against the Belt and Road Initiative in the African Continent. This combined vision of India and Japan is to promote development, connectivity, and cooperation between Africa and Asia, is a counter-balance strategy against China in Africa (Panda, 2017). Also India increased its military ties with Africa (Usmani, 2023).

Island Chain Strategy of China

To ease the maritime power projection, China uses Island chain strategy, which is a geographical security concept to project its offensive or defensive power against its adversaries in the periphery of the island chain through maritime expansion in these regions. PLA (N) expansion of the island chain has now grown beyond Oceania into the Indian Ocean and the African continent. The First Island Chain spans Kurils, the Japanese archipelago, and the Ryukyus to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, the Second island chain stretches from Japan through the Marianas and Micronesia, and the third island chain spans the Hawaii region. The Fourth island chain stretches beyond the Pacific Islands chain into the Indian Ocean. China established its military strategy in Cambodia, which is a highly strategic location in the Gulf of Thailand to contain its adversaries in the South China Sea and Southern Pacific regions. It lends a $259 mn loan to Cambodia for infrastructure development projects (Reuters, 2018). Further both countries are involved in bilateral defense ties, many joint military exercises are carried out by Chinese and Cambodian forces, also Beijing promised to provide 100 million US$ for the modernization of Cambodia’s armed forces. In addition, Chinese warships visited Cambodia’s Sihanoukville deep water port in the Gulf of Thailand (Agence France-Presse, 2019). Further extension of China’s military establishment, it constructed a dual-purpose port at Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar port in Pakistan. The Fifth Island Chain spans the Western Indian Ocean and African Continent, in which China constructed its overseas naval base in Djibouti (Vorndick, 2018).

The militarization of artificial islands, Spratly, and Parcels in the South China Sea support China in maritime power projection against its adversaries in the first and second island chains. Surveillance optical tracking system in Vanuatu strengthens China’s espionage in the Southern Pacific Island chain (Chan, 2018). The location of Hambantota and Gwadar deep-water ports in the fourth island chain is a strategic maritime threat to India. In a critical situation, these Chinese ports in the Indian Ocean will be leveraged into the naval base for coercive escalation against India. The Sixth island chain peripheral covers Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, Mauritius, Mozambique, and Tanzania, where China’s trade agreements, infrastructure developments, and maritime expeditions in these regions are thriving coercive security threat in the Western Indian Ocean region. On par with China, India is raising its strategic position to choke China’s navigation in the Indian Ocean through military access to strategically located deep-sea Sabang port in Indonesia, which deters China in the straits of Malacca and Oman’s Duqm Port (Thakker, 2018).

These island chains are not officially demarcated, but it is tentative Sea Lanes of Communication for Beijing’s maritime expedition to secure its Belt and Road Initiative and its investments in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s military interest in Seychelles is a highly strategic location to deter India’s maritime access to the African continent and Atlantic countries as well (Singh, 2011). Also this is a strategic coercion for the U.S. Navy’s presence in Diego Garcia. Developing dual-purpose ports and overseas naval bases around the Indian Ocean is a swarming model tactic of China against India in the Indian Ocean Region to leverage its power projection. In addition China’s rising economic interest and bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia and signed a memorandum to boost cooperation on the Silk Road Economic Belt in this region (Saudi Press Agency, 2022).This will be a strategic coercion for India and its strategic partners in the Persian gulf and western Indian Ocean region.

Conclusion

To countermeasure China’s strategy in the Western Indian Ocean region and Africa, it is appropriate for India to strengthen its diplomatic and military balance with the Western Indian Ocean Island nations and African continent. Besides, to reduce Chinas influence in the southern Indian Ocean, the Intrigue of China in Sri Lanka will be intercession by India through both traditional and open diplomacy. Also by providing more financial and technical aid to maintain the political and social stability, or else after a decade, Sri Lanka will become a client state of China in the Southern part of Indian Ocean region. To neutralize China’s military power projection and for defensive strategy in the Indian Ocean region, it is appropriate for India to establish an Indian Ocean command; as a net security provider to the countries around the Indian Ocean region and beyond as a policy prescription. Moreover this will strengthen India’s military and naval interoperability with its partners in the Indian Ocean Rim Association and QUAD. In status quo, the QUAD will set a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) to avoid economic, political, and technological coercion risks from China. Any military operation against China will leverage its strategy and offensive power projection into the Indo-Pacific region, which expedites India and its security partner’s surge to neutralize power projection for regional, geo-political, and geo-economic stability, against combat ready Chinese military forces.

This study also suggests that fostering the Western Indian Ocean coalition by India (WIQUAD Plus) with countries of such as Oman, South Africa, the French Reunion, Mauritius, and Madagascar defense ties are appropriate to deter China in the Western Indian Ocean region. Further, to choke strategic locations of China in the Indo-Pacific region, Countries such as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand are need to be supported in terms of finance and essential technologies, this will reduce China’s influence (Debt trap diplomacy) and avert these countries will become a Client state of China in the future. In addition, on par with China’s assistance in the Pacific region, India needs to extend its support through Capacity Building and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) to India – Pacific Islands Cooperation (FIPIC). In the status quo, raising China’s hypersonic ballistic missile threats and nuclear capability, it is appropriate to initiate a joint missile defense program with India-Israel-U.S-Canada (I2UC). This will be a deterrence for China, also it strengthens the maritime security from Indo-Pacific to Atlantic Region against China’s geostrategic aggressive posture.

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