Arthashastra Concept |
Description (Arthashastra) |
Hybrid Warfare Equivalent |
Continuous manoeuvring & secrecy during peace (Book 7, Ch. 13) |
Ruler should make strategic moves & maintain secrecy even during negotiations. |
Blurring lines of warfare |
Asuravijayin (Book 7, Ch. 10) |
Weakening enemy through economic means. |
Economic warfare |
Kuta Yuddha (Book 1, Ch. 4) |
Fear, surprise attacks, exploiting vulnerabilities, and clandestine methods. |
Psychological operations (PsyOps) |
Bheda (Book 12, Ch. 1 & 2) |
Using covert operatives to incite coups, rebellions, or assassinations. |
Subversive political activities |
Gudha Yuddha (Boesche, 2003) |
Female operatives, poisoned wine, poisoned water sources, etc. for elimination. |
Clandestine operations |
Source: By author
The parameters mentioned in the table above will be discussed further in the paper.
Philosophy of Arthashastra on warfare strategies
In world politics, when national security interests of one state collude with the interests of other state or non-state entity, it gives rise to conflict and war. In India, there have been talks about hybrid warfare, at least since the Kautilya period. Well-known as the science of statecraft, Arthashastra elucidates on diplomacy, deception, inter-state relations, espionage, war tactics, types of warfare, etc. He depicts war as an expression of foreign policy of a state. Even though he had conceived of the concept of means and ends over 2,000 years ago, Kautilya had a firm understanding of it. He was an expert in the science of war, strategy, and tactics. Moreover, Kautilya discussed how secret missions, covert operations, and diplomatic offensives can be employed through state policy. All these concepts are still applicable and in use even in modern times. He argued that non-violent means of victory were preferable to violent bloodshed and the exorbitant cost of war. He also discussed using the full-spectrum of capabilities and authority available at the government’s disposal to achieve the desired results.
Applying contributions from Radhakrishnan Pillai (Pillai, 2019) and R.P Kangle (Kangle, 2010) books and Dr Kajari Kamal’s (Kamal, 2018) journal article on Arthashastra the following can be observed on philosophy of war as suggested by Kautilya.
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Open war is fighting at the place and time indicated; creating fright, sudden assault, striking when there is error or a calamity, giving way and striking in one place, are types of concealed warfare; that which concerns secret practices and instigations through secret agents is the mark of silent war. (7.6.40-41) (Kangle, 2010)
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When one of these is making ready to start, he should make a counter move through peace or diplomatic war or concealed warfare. (He should win over) the party inimical to him with conciliation and gifts, his own party through dissension and force. (Kangle, 2010)
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1 If he were not to accept a peace-treaty, he should say to him, ‘Such and such kings, under the influence of the group of six enemies, have perished; it does not behove you to follow in the foot-steps of those who were without self-control. 2 You should pay regard to spiritual and material wellbeing. 3 For, those are really enemies, wearing the mask of friends, who make you undertake a rash deed, an impious act and the forgoing of material good. 4 To fight with brave men who have given up all hope of life is a rash deed, to bring about the loss of men on both sides is an impious act, to give up a good in hand and to forsake a blameless ally is forgoing of material good. 5 And that king has allies and with this object he will raise more allies, who will attack you from all sides. 6 Nor is he forsaken by the middle and neutral kings or by the circle of kings; you, however, are forsaken (by them), since, while you are ready to fight, they are looking on with (with the idea), “Let him meet with further losses and expenses, let him be divided from his ally; then we shall easily exterminate him when he has left his kingdom”. 7 It does not behove you, therefore, to listen to enemies masquerading as friends, to frighten your allies and to confer good on your enemies and to face the risk of (losing your) life and meet with disaster; thus he should (try to) restrain him. (12.2.1-7) (Kangle, 2010)
The above seven sutras stipulate that in the event that a king declines to sign a peace treaty with adversaries, the attacking kind should be notified of potential repercussions of initiating a war. This communication must be conducted via diplomatic channels, employing an envoy. The attacking king must be apprised of the fact that widespread unrest among the civilian populace of both sides is likely to ensue in the event of an armed conflict. The attacking monarch should also be informed that their allies are supporting them for the purpose of utilizing them to overthrow the reigning monarch. However, if the attacker king emerges weakened after the confrontation, their allies will also turn against them. The attacking kind should be reminded that prevalence of peace is much more profitable than war. This is what the concept of war by counsel entails.
Types of War
Kautilya mentions certain kinds of war in the text as:
Mantra Yuddha: ‘War by counsel’, employment of diplomacy by a weaker king or monarch who believes it would be unwise to engage in combat with a powerful adversary or foe. Mantra Yuddha is simply the use and exercise of diplomacy to win wars. This technique is used when the king is more vulnerable and weak, and going to war and fighting would not be prudent or advantageous. Mantrayuddha amounts to cajoling, warning, threatening etc., through an envoy. (Kangle, 2010). For Kautilya, all ambassadors were potential spies with diplomatic immunity (Boesche, 2003)
Prakasha Yuddha: Open warfare, regular warfare, is a conventional battle fought between two parties at a decided place and time. The combat operations are guided by a set of mutually agreed-upon guidelines. In this scenario, it is crucial to formulate a strategy that will help to win over the opponent.
Kuta Yuddha: Concealed warfare, referring to ‘upajapa’ which is psychological warfare including ambushes and raids in enemy territory. Kuta Yuddha resembles guerrilla warfare. This warfare goes beyond just the physical zone of conflict. It is conducted discreetly, and the adversary is taken by surprise. In concealed warfare, everything is explained through the fusion of the power of intellect and the might of weaponry. In modern conflict, this can be seen through the use of deception, where ambushes, feints, false information, and other deceptive manoeuvres are employed to demoralise, mislead, or confuse the opponent.
Gudha Yuddha: Clandestine war, also called silent war. Gudha yuddha involves striking the enemy in silence and stealth, which is in contrast to the method of open warfare. It is typically done to gradually diminish the enemy’s power. Spying, spreading misinformation, propaganda and espionage are big parts of the silent war, and military action is minimal in comparison to Kuta Yuddha. Understanding the psychology of the opponent is a key element in clandestine war. This will help to create an internal division in the adversary's camp to win a war. Roger Boesche analysed (Boesche, 2003),
It is a kind of warfare with another kingdom in which the king and his ministers- and unknowingly, the people-all act publicly as if they were at peace with opposing kingdom, but all while secret agents and spies are assassinating important leaders in the other kingdom, creating divisions among key ministers and classes, and spreading propaganda and disinformation.
Kautilya maintained that no opponent should be aware of the inner workings and procedures of one's state and that any dangers to national security must be destroyed at any cost to the state. Kautilya, however, suggested a vast network of spies and agents working both inside the state and in neighbouring and hostile governments in order to preserve security. (Pillai, 2019)
These are the basic forms of warfare that Kautilya suggests, which run parallel to the concept of hybrid warfare. Compiling these strategies and guidelines together and blending them equips the state to defend its territory and protect its people from internal, external, and contemporary hybrid threats. This is a multi-pronged strategy toward national security similar to today's hybrid battlefield, which proves the farsightedness of the text as it is still relatable to the present-day character of hybrid warfare. Working in tandem with and blending these warfare strategies provides a good doctrine to tackle the threat of hybrid warfare.
Types of Conquests
Despite changes in its character, it is evident that the primary purposes of conflict and warfare between states have continued to be conquest and exploitation of the adversary. Conquest is a subset of warfare strategy. It denotes war in the form of acquiring power through annexation of territories. Conquests tend to feature episodes of dissension and force. History is proof that states have always desired to conquer and expand their territories to gain a superior position in the international system. It is a common tendency of states to exhibit this desire. As we discussed above hybrid warfare is the simultaneous application of military and non-military tactics. It incentivizes use of all available domains, conventional and non-conventional at all levels. The reason behind this is the ambiguous nature of hybrid warfare. Therefore, it becomes crucial to take on board the dimension of conquests as recommended by Kautilya in Arthashastra. However, this involves gaining an understanding of the enemy and the threat it poses. The application of Arthashastra’s wisdom lies herein. Kautilya explains the importance of possessing a competitive drive and the ability to conquer without the use of physical harm or violence. His emphasis is on the attitude with which a ruler should formulate a strategy to conquer. This signifies maintaining ethical demeanour where rivals would reverently bend down. (Pillai, 2019).
As per Kautilya, in foreign policy one of the role of the ruler was expansion. He explains that the ruler should be a ‘vijigishu’, ‘desirous of conquering’, who was desirous of expanding their dominion over other territories. The vijigishu is expected to strategize and plan his conquests based on the prevailing conditions at the time. (Kangle, 2010) The end goal is ensuring security and protection of the state. In Arthashastra, Kautilya categorizes conquests into three types: (12.1.10-16)
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There are three types of conquerors.
Dharmavijayain: Righteous conqueror, here a weaker king merely submits to other kings and the righteous conqueror makes conquests for the purpose of glory. As the term itself suggests, it is the righteous and ethical way of doing things. Here, submission to another king is not surrender. There is an acceptance of power in an ethical manner without any bloodshed and killings.
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A weak king attacked by a stronger king, should everywhere remain submissive showing the characteristics of a reed. (Kangle, 2010)
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Of them, the righteous conqueror is satisfied with submission. (Kangle, 2010)
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He should submit to him also when there is danger from others. (Kangle, 2010)
Lobhavijayain: Greedy conqueror, one who conquers out of greed and seeks to acquire either money, or land, or both. To acquire land and goods is the primary motive of the greedy conqueror. He is out to reap economic benefits and are never satisfied. There is no end to this conquest. The conqueror is not only interested in seizing land but also idols, antiques, ornaments etc.
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The greedy conqueror is satisfied with seizure of land and goods. (Kangle, 2010)
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He should yield money to him. (Kangle, 2010)
Asuravijayain: Demonic conqueror, Asuravijaya is the demonic conquest. One who makes demon-like conquest stealing, money, land and the wives of the vanquished king while killing the adversary. This method justifies using every means possible to acquire total and absolute power. There are no rules of war in this conquest. The demonic conquest is not guided by emotions. The conquest will not stop until everything is acquired. This conquest is cruel, oppressive and cunning in nature which can be used as a last resort.
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The demoniacal conqueror (is satisfied only) with the seizure of land, goods, sons, wives and life. (Kangle, 2010)
War Tactics or Six Gunas
As discussed above in the paper, hybrid warfare involves the combination of conventional and unconventional tactics and policies to weaken the adversary. Foreign policy and war tactics are two of the many spectrums under the umbrella term of hybrid warfare. The role of these two policies is multifaceted and can have some significant implications for a nation’s ability to navigate and respond effectively to these complex hybrid threats. It is therefore imperative to employ foreign policy and war tactics to diffuse threats emanating from outside national borders. Roger Boesche maintained in his paper (Boesche, 2003)
…Because foreign policy is just an extension of a nation’s wars, the goal of foreign policy is not to end wars, but rather ward off defeats and to make sure one is successful in subsequent warfare.
There are several aspects of the relationship between hybrid warfare and these policies. The act of maintaining diplomatic silence provides the opportunity to exploit time, which is an important consideration in planning a surprise attack against the enemy. By demonstrating collective strength and a unified front against hybrid threats, foreign policy decisions about alliances, treaties and partnerships can aid in deterrence. From the point of view of the hybrid threat of information warfare and perception management, through foreign policy clear communication and strategic messaging can help counter disinformation campaigns and propaganda. Considering economic statecraft, tactics can be used to disable the adversary’s economic undertakings or other economic measures can be tools to deter hybrid threats by limiting the capabilities of the adversary. Developing a well-crafted crisis response and conflict resolution mechanism to build deterrence is an essential element in countering hybrid warfare. The basic tenet of hybrid warfare is that tactics and policies should vary according to circumstances. Kautilya favours this six-fold classification for the same reason and also advices that these gunas can be simultaneously applied for successful results. All this can be seen reflected in the policy of ‘Sãdgunya’ or six gunas in Arthashastra. The six gunas can also be called war tactics because of its resemblance of the art of organizing and employing fighting tactics in combat and non-combat zones. As per Kautilya, in a system of anarchy where multiple states coexist a vijigishu must adopt a six-fold policy to effectively manage relationships with various mitras (ally’s) and aris (enemies). All these policies aim to outlast the enemy in the longer run. The classification of the six measures is as follows:
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These are really six measures because of differences in situations, says Kautilya. (7.1.5) (Kangle, 2010)
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6 Among them entering into a treaty is peace. 7 Doing injury is war. 8 Remaining indifferent is staying quiet. 9 Augmentation of (powers) is marching. 10 Submitting to another is seeking shelter. 11 Resorting to peace (with one) and war (with another) is dual policy. 12 These are the six gunas. (7.1.6-12) (Kangle, 2010)
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13 When in decline as compared to the enemy, he should make peace. 14 When prospering, he should make war. 15 (When he thinks) ‘The enemy is not able to do harm to me, nor I to him,’ he should stay quiet. 16 When possessed of a preponderance of excellent qualities, he should march. 17 Depleted in power, he should seek shelter. 18 In a work that can be achieved with the help of an associate, he should resort to dual policy. 19 Thus are the measure established. (7.1.13-18) (Kangle, 2010)
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20 Of them he should follow that policy by resorting to which he may be able to see, ‘By resorting to this, I shall be able to promote my own undertakings concerning forts, water-works, trade-routes, settling on waste land, mines, material forests and elephant forests, and to injure these undertakings of the enemy.’ (7.1.20) (Kangle, 2010)
Samdhi (alliance): making a treaty containing conditions or terms, that is, the policy of peace; The samdhi policy is predicated on the idea that a state has to attempt to negotiate a peaceful agreement with a more powerful foe in order to survive. Samdhi is to be followed when vijigishu is weaker than the enemy. In the event that a monarch finds themselves compelled to enter into a treaty, it is recommended that they employ cunning tactics to circumvent their more powerful adversary while fulfilling the conditions of the agreement. Once the necessary time has elapsed and the monarch has grown in strength, they may then proceed to overthrow their once-dominant foe. The policy of samdhi, which involves the offering of concessions due to one’s relative weakness, is typically imposed in such situations. It is worth noting that such treaties may necessitate the surrender of troops or treasury or territory. Such treaties are called dandopanata-samdhi, kosopanata-samdhi and desopanata samdhi respectively. (7.3.22-35). A distinctive feature of this policy is the way in which it considers potential or hypothetical agreements between vijigishu and his opponents. Certain agreements such as those with (paripanita samdhi) or without (aparipanita samdhi) stipulations, aim to outsmart or deceive the enemy in order to allow vijigishu to gain power at the expense of the rival. When he has weakened a neighbour, the king should violate the treaty (7.14.7) (Boesche, 2003). In addition to these there are more such speculative pacts where the aim is to outscore the opponent. In conclusion the purpose samdhi to deceive and camouflage the real intention by giving it the face of a friendly venture.
Vigraha (war): the policy of hostility; the vigraha policy has been found to be a useful tool for both defensive and offensive purposes when dealing with potential threats. Vigraha policy is recommended when counterattacks are considered to be effective. Furthermore, this policy can be implemented to disrupt the adversary's plan or capture their territory, specifically when they are fighting on multiple fronts. Organisations can accomplish their strategic objectives along with mitigating any potential threats through this policy. (7.1.33)
Yãna (military expedition): marching on an expedition; the yãna policy is an acknowledgment of the growing constituent elements of a state and the need to increase and deploy resources in preparation for war, considering the increase in capabilities. The policy recognizes the importance of strategic resource management, with the goal to ensure that the state can effectively safeguard its interests in times of conflict. The yãna policy underscores the need to proactively maintain and build a strong military infrastructure, along with the development of advanced weaponry and technologies. In order to meet the ever-changing requirements of dynamic modern warfare, this approach entails a coordinated and comprehensive effort towards deploying, acquiring, and identifying the most effective resources. Roger Boesche argues in his paper (Boesche, 2003),
Kautilya considered the treasury most valuable in raising an army, procuring equipment, and preparing for war.
Asana (halting): the policy of remaining quiet; The policy of asana is a strategic approach that entails withstanding the adversary in the anticipation that they will weaken or encounter difficulties in their operations. It is also characterized by a sense of optimism that one will eventually outmanoeuvre the opposition and acquire greater power for oneself. Typically, this policy is employed in conjunction with the Samdhi policy. However, it may also be combined with vigraha in specific situations, such as when the objective is to entice the enemy's subjects to become loyal to one's cause, or when it is expected that one will gain something at the enemy's expense in the immediate future. Moreover, this policy may be implemented when it is believed that the adversary may weaken themselves in the interim by engaging in some venture. The ultimate goal of this policy is to gain a strategic advantage over the opposition and to secure one's interests.
Samsraya (seeking protection): seeking shelter with another king; Samsraya is a strategic approach that is adopted by several states with the objective of augmenting their manoeuvrability and strengthening their position by forming alliances with more influential states. This approach is typically employed by weaker monarchs who are faced with attacks or threats from a stronger adversary. The text, specifically Book 7, Chapter 2, Sutras 1 through 25, devotes an entire section to the conduct of the king while seeking refuge. Samsraya is a means for weaker states to become protégés of more powerful states, thereby ensuring their safety. The ultimate aim of this policy is to empower the king to become more independent and stronger.
Dvaidhibhãva (dual policy): the dual policy of samdhi with one king and vigraha with another at the same time; The policy of "Dvaidhibhãva" is not a novel concept. It refers to a situation where a king is concurrently at peace with one king while being at war with another. The ultimate goal of this policy is to acquire military or financial aid from one king to assist in the resolution of conflicts with other kings. It can be seen as playing one against another through the lens of modern conflict.
All policies advocated by Kautilya aim to acquire growth in power, usually at the expense of one's enemies. The primary purpose of gaining an edge over the opponent is to be realised by first increasing one's own power. It is said that the vijigishu can manipulate other monarchs as he pleases, as long as he uses the six stratagems appropriately, as they are essentially bound to him by his intellectual powers. The concept of hybrid warfare is closely linked to this matter as these gunas signify military and non-military methods that can be parallel in their application. These six measures are similar to war tactics that fall in the ambit of sub-conventional and unconventional strategies in hybrid warfare.
The four-fold strategy
In hybrid warfare, there is a variation in levels of development across the different modes of warfare characterized by its multifaceted nature. As discussed in the paper above, asymmetric conflicts, blending and fusion of various forms of wars, blurring lines of warfare, subversive acts etc. when aligned together provides an insight into the concept of hybrid warfare. These are essentially a combination of military and non-military tactics which keep changing depending upon the circumstances. Therefore, a rigid strategy or a fixed approach will not be effective enough. Different circumstances call for different responses. The ability to evaluate a situation considering all factors and arrive at a decision optimal for the success and security is a crucial element in the planning of a comprehensive strategy countering hybrid threats. The hallmark of hybrid warfare is its complexity, as it involves combining approaches to accomplish strategic goals. To overcome this complexity Kautilya advices the leader to develop ‘vivek buddhi’. Vivek Buddhi necessitates an awareness of human nature in the context of statecraft and diplomacy, in interactions with external parties. This knowledge is essential for securing the interests of the state and achieving victory. It is an integral part of the decision-making process that enables a ruler to anticipate and respond appropriately to the diverse needs of countering hybrid threats.
The four-fold strategy involving the concepts of Sama, Dana, Danda and Bheda emphasize the value of an all-encompassing and flexible approach to combat and can be seen as precursors to the diverse tools and tactics employed in hybrid warfare. The four-fold strategy provides valuable insights into the intricate dynamics and tactics employed in modern-day conflicts characterized by hybrid warfare. The four upayas involve the use of diplomatic persuasion, financial incentives, coercive tactics and methods that involve sowing or creating division. The fourfold approach acknowledges the importance of non-military tactics and strategies and offers a comprehensive understanding of contemporary conflicts and their complex nature. By drawing inferences from Radhakrishnan Pillai (Pillai, 2019), R.P Kangle (Kangle, 2010) and Roger Boesche (Boesche, 2003) the classification can be aligned to hybrid warfare in the following ways:
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Conciliation used in the case of ministers under suspicion of the enemy renders unnecessary the use of remaining (means), gifts used in the cause of treasonable ministers, dissension used in the cause of confederates, (and) force used in the case of the powerful. (Kangle, 2010)
The above sutra sets forth that the Arthashastra outlines several strategies for dealing with enemy states. Specifically, the text recommends the use of "Bheda" to break up confederacies, and "Danda" to deal with a strong enemy. When dealing with enemy officers suspected of treason, the text suggests using "Sama," while "Dana" is recommended for winning over seditious individuals. Book Eleven of the "Arthashastra" provides detailed instructions on how to effectively implement the strategy of Bheda to overcome the enmity of Samghas (oligarchical principalties). By applying the strategy of Bheda, it is possible to effectively break up confederacies, as outlined in the text.
Sama (conciliation): Sama highlights the use of conciliation through persuasive means to achieve one's objectives. This approach necessitates using diplomacy, negotiation, and the art of influencing perceptions without resorting to force. Concerning hybrid warfare, it is similar to using non-military tools like information warfare and political influence campaigns. In a broader framework, deception can also be viewed as a tactic through persuasion. This aspect suggests declaring something that is known to be false with the intent of being misleading. Deception acts as a conduit to manipulate and influence perceptions to conceal true intentions, shape narratives, lull opponents into a false sense of security or complacency, feign weakness, etc., all while preparing to attack. The use of cunning diplomacy can also be viewed within the realm of persuasion to gain a strategic advantage over the enemy. This may involve false promises, and deceptive negotiations to achieve favourable outcomes. Deceptive actors may exploit the advantage of their opponents' cognitive biases and weaknesses in decision-making by posing threats, decoys, or diversionary tactics, leading them astray to obtain the upper hand in war. This is a really subtle act of war which is always being planned for with the objective to conquer. It can be seen as an extension of warfare to build a foundation for conquest. By leveraging deception through persuasion, tactically and judiciously, the objective of winning over the enemy can be achieved.
Dana (gifts; economic angle): The concept that Dana alludes to involves the acquisition of favour or support from individuals or groups through the use of economic or material incentives. This practice may be associated with financial inducements, provision of financial assistance to proxies, or surreptitious financial operations within the context of hybrid warfare, all with the objective of influencing or destabilizing adversaries. Through the lens of hybrid warfare, Dana can be viewed as a tactic within debt trap diplomacy and economic warfare. Extending monetary assistance or loans at the risk of the borrower's sovereignty to obtain strategic or economic autonomy is known as debt-trap diplomacy. This gives a chance to the lending country to impose conditionality’s like granting access to natural resources, privatizing state owned enterprises thereby compromising borrowers’ sovereignty and autonomy. The long term dependency caused by this makes the borrowers susceptible to external influence and manipulation. This debt trap diplomacy and economic coercion are forms of economic warfare. The purpose is to use this tactic as a strategic leverage to exert control over the economic decisions in order to weaken the enemy and acquire its economic assets (Boesche, 2003).These unconventional tools are used to undermine the economic resilience of adversaries and limit their strategic options.
Danda (force): Danda entails using coercion, punishment or force to achieve objectives. Danda is a strategy that involves the use of either coercion or force to attain one's objectives. This approach bears striking similarities to the military components of hybrid warfare, which may encompass the deployment of conventional military operations, Special Forces, or irregular forces aimed at destabilizing the situation or interfering with the enemy's operations. The use of Danda can provide effective means to achieve strategic objectives by exerting pressure on the opponent or leveraging their weaknesses. The Arthashastra employs the term danda to refer to the utilization of force or coercion to achieve strategic objectives. Such employment encompasses the use of military force, punitive measures, and the threat of punishment to thwart the threats from adversaries. Kautilya desired that his monarch arm the country in order to identify or create a weakness in the enemy and conquer (Boesche, 2003). Hence, based around the contemporary hybrid warfare, danda can be linked to deterrence. Deterrence involves the use of threats of dire consequences to discourage enemies from pursuing particular courses of action or policies. Danda uses force to deter actors by the threat of retaliation or punishment to dissuade adversaries from engaging in activities that can hamper the security interests of the deterrence holder. This deterrence can be coercive, military and hybrid in nature where various domains, military and punitive, can be employed to gain an edge over the opponent. In the modern world politics nuclear weapons are used as a deterrence to stop the enemy from challenging state’s interests.
Bheda (division): Bheda focuses on creating divisions and discords among the adversaries. Bheda's primary objective is to sow dissension and division among adversaries. According to Kautilya's doctrine, it is prudent to launch an attack on a divided adversary (Boesche, 2003). In times of peace and negotiation, spies and secret agents can exploit internal divisions within a nation, as suggested by Kautilya. It is best to attack an enemy that is disunited. (Boesche, 2003). Sutra 18 of chapter 11, book 7 says,
As between land with people disunited and one with people in bands, that with people disunited is preferable.
By fomenting unrest among the populace and exacerbating existing divisions, covert operatives can further deepen these differences and destabilize the situation. Hence, Kautilya's strategic concepts highlight the imperativeness of leveraging internal divisions to achieve strategic dominance in a conflict. These tactics involve exploiting social fragmentation to undermine the enemy, which can be achieved through various means. One such tactic includes extending support to internal dissidents, who can play a critical role in destabilizing the enemy’s internal structure. This concept closely aligns with psychological warfare and proxy warfare, two key components of modern hybrid warfare. The primary aim of psychological warfare is to diminish the determination and resilience of enemy populations to external influence by generating confusion, demoralization, and divisiveness among them by using covert or clandestine operations. This is usually achieved by the dissemination of false narratives, instilling suspicion or fear, and undermining faith in leadership or institutions. Finally, Bheda involves exploiting vulnerabilities to destroy the enemy internally and externally. Bheda is a tactic that can be used to achieve strategic objectives without direct involvement or escalation. This tactic might be used to subtly incite conflict between the nation and a neighbouring country. It can take the form of proxy warfare, where support is covertly provided to terrorist groups, militias or insurgent groups within enemy territory. This allows hybrid players to destabilize the opposing government and foster unrest and instability while maintaining plausible deniability. By subverting governance, arming, financing or sheltering proxy groups, pressure is applied and goals are advanced without direct credit or escalation. It intends to target adversary’s vulnerabilities and exploit them to create chaos and division, which can further weaken the adversary's resolve making them susceptible to defeat.
While the concept of hybrid warfare is a modern one that encompasses a range of military and non-military tactics, these parallels can be drawn between Kautilya’s fourfold strategy and the elements of hybrid warfare. Arthashastra’s timeless principles offer valuable insights into the complexities of modern conflict, providing a comprehensive framework that encompasses unconventional and non-military methods of statecraft and warfare. Radhakrishnan Pillai opines (Pillai, 2019):
…the permutation and combination of these four words contain infinite possibilities……they can make or break a kingdom.
By incorporating persuasion, coercion, bribery, and division this all-encompassing strategy highlights the multi-dimensional and multi-modal nature of hybrid warfare. This implies that an array of tools and tactics are applied across various domains to achieve strategic objectives. Understanding and applying Kautilya’s strategic principles in the context of hybrid warfare can enhance our comprehension of contemporary conflicts, inform strategic decision-making, and contribute to the development of effective responses to the challenges of the 21st-century security landscape. Thus, integrating fourfold strategy into the study of hybrid warfare offers illuminating insights and perspectives that can deepen our understanding of the complexities and dynamics of hybrid conflict.
The Annexation of Crimea: A case study in Hybrid Warfare
Taking the case study of Russian annexation of Crimea based on the analysis available through the works of Ostap Kushnir (Kushnir, 2017), James K Wither (Wither, 2016) and Kent DeBenedictis (DeBenedictis, 2021) following inferences can be drawn:
The annexation of Crimea by Russia marked a significant event in contemporary warfare, characterized by the strategic utilisation of hybrid warfare tactics. It showcased a novel approach – hybrid warfare – that blurred the lines between conventional military actions and non-kinetic instruments of power. In the case of Crimea, Russia employed a multifaceted approach that capitalized on a combination of military, political, and informational tactics to orchestrate the annexation while minimizing overt military intervention. This case study will delve into the multifaceted toolbox employed by Russia in Crimea, dissecting the key elements of hybrid warfare and their synergistic impact on the peninsula’s takeover.
1. Unconventional Troop Deployment: “Little Green Men” and Informational Denial
At the outset, Russia's approach relied on the operation of unidentifiable military operatives, infamously known as “little green men.” By repudiating any association with the Russian military, Russia successfully generated uncertainty on the battlefield. Further, this strategy was bolstered by manipulating information through cyberattacks that disabled the Ukrainian government and media sites, fostering confusion and alarm within the Crimean populace.
2. Exploiting Ethnic and Historical Tensions
Russia wisely utilised the historical and ethnic composition of Crimea, where a substantial portion of the population identified as Russian. The pro-Russian sentiment was augmented by propaganda disseminated via state-controlled media and local allies. This narrative was successful in moulding public opinion in favour of annexation by portraying the intervention as a break from an antagonistic Ukrainian administration.
3. Coercive Diplomacy and Economic Pressure
Russia applied intense diplomatic pressure on Ukraine by threatening military escalation, all while compromising the legitimacy of the newly formed Ukrainian government. Moreover, Ukraine's stance and position were sabotaged by economic pressure, which was heavily dependent on Russia's control over the nation's energy sources in Crimea. The economic pressure was further intensified by Russia's control over a considerable portion of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, particularly the natural gas pipelines transiting Crimea. Russia’s economic control in the energy industry over Ukraine was an effective tool for coercion. Ukraine was compelled to comply with Russian demands because of its heavy reliance on Russian sources, which hindered its ability to respond or counteract. By threatening to cut off or disrupt gas supplies to Ukraine and Europe, Russia exerted a considerable amount of economic pressure on Ukraine, which acted as a deterrent to any potential Western military intervention.
4. Orchestrated Referendum and Rapid Military Mobilization
A referendum was hastily held amidst allegations of irregularities in an attempt to legitimise the annexation of Crimea. The presence of the Russian military hovering over the proceedings made the situation worse. Concurrently, Russia mobilised a sizeable conventional military campaign within Crimea, effectively thwarting any attempts at Ukrainian intervention.
In summary, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 is a prime instance of the intentional application of hybrid warfare tactics to accomplish geopolitical goals without resorting to conventional military actions. While preserving plausible deniability and reducing international backlash, Russia was able to orchestrate the annexation of Crimea by employing a multifaceted approach. The employment of hybrid warfare in Crimea highlights the dynamism and evolving nature of modern conflicts and the importance of inculcating diplomatic, economic, and strategic aspects while devising a comprehensive response.
Aligning the case study to the concepts in Arthashastra
The Table 2, presented below, demonstrates the parallel comparison of the Russian Annexation of Crimea to the tenets of the hybrid warfare. It showcases that there is a close similarity and equivalence between the tenets on the philosophy of war in Arthashastra and the hybrid strategies used by Russia to annex Crimea in 2014. The relevant data for a comprehensive comparison is provided in the table given below.
Table 2: Arthashastra Concepts and Russia's Strategy in Crimea
Concept |
Description |
Example in Crimean Conflict |
Gudha Yuddha (Secret Warfare) |
Use of covert methods to achieve military objectives |
Unmarked troops ("little green men"), information manipulation, cyberattacks |
Dvaidhibhava (Playing One Against Another) |
Maintaining a facade of peace while using covert actions for secret advantage |
Publicly denying involvement while using unmarked troops and manipulating information |
Bheda (Sowing Discord) |
Creating confusion and distrust among the enemy |
Disrupting communication channels, amplifying ethnic/historical tensions |
Danda (Force) |
Using military might or the threat of force to achieve political goals |
Use of unmarked troops as a veiled threat |
Kuta Yuddha (Deceptive Warfare) |
Using psychological warfare and exploiting divisions within the enemy |
Propaganda to exploit ethnic/historical ties, creating a hasty referendum |
Mantrayuddha (Diplomacy) |
Negotiation and statecraft, but can have underlying threats |
Undermining Ukrainian government legitimacy through propaganda and diplomacy |
Sama (Persuasion) |
Negotiation and compromise |
Peaceful negotiations coupled with threats of military action |
Dana (Economic Coercion) |
Using economic pressure to achieve political objectives |
Threatening to cut off energy supplies or manipulate prices |
Lobhavijayin (Economic exploitation) |
Taking advantage of an enemy's economic dependence |
Exploiting Ukraine's economic dependence on energy after political turmoil |
Yana (Military Movement) |
Strategic movement of forces to assert control or intimidate |
Rapid military mobilization in Crimea to deter Ukrainian resistance |
Vigraha ( Warfare) |
Direct military engagement with adversaries |
Deployment of substantial military force in Crimea to signal willingness to use force |
Source: By author
Conclusion
Over the past generation millions of pages have been written and documented in the annals of war. The Hybrid war has brought about power shift at various levels in warfare. The military prowess will mean mastery in the seemingly complex mechanism of Hybrid warfare. Hybrid Warfare has unleashed powerful cross currents, gaining momentum and changing the character of warfare.
This study initially looked at different interpretations of hybrid warfare to gain a full understanding of this evolving threat. After careful analysis, it identified the key components of hybrid warfare: the strategic combination of conventional and unconventional methods to achieve specific goals. Further research focused on understanding the precepts of war as elucidated in Arthashastra. This examination revealed significant similarities between Kautilya's strategies and the characteristics of modern hybrid warfare.
The case study of Annexation of Crimea demonstrating the use of hybrid tactics, is reflective of the tenets in Arthashastra demonstrating that the ancient text written over two millennia ago continues to be extremely relevant in present times. By gaining an analytical understanding of the different aspects of hybrid war in relation to the philosophy of war as outlined in Arthashastra, the research established a strong connection between the two. It is possible to inculcate the Arthashastra’s postulates on warfare as a counter strategy to the complex threat of hybrid warfare. In conclusion, this research makes a credible case for the continued relevance of Arthashastra that withstands the test of time and provides one grand strategy to mitigate the challenges of hybrid warfare.
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