

Mongolia's Historic Relations with its Largest Neighbour: Russia

Sureyya Yigit, PhD¹

Abstract

Mongolia's foreign policy can be seen as fairly straightforward given the fact it has only two neighbours. The only problem is, however, the neighbours are Russia and China. This is a challenge that Mongolians have been facing for centuries and especially so since gaining their independence in the 20th century as the world's second socialist state. This article examines the origins of the Mongol-Russian relationship, noting the geopolitical importance of Mongolian territories both for Czarist Russia and the Bolshevik Revolution. It investigates the twists and turns that have endured throughout this relationship, offering an insight into the very recent past as well as the present.

Keywords: Mongolia, Russia, Geopolitics, Foreign Policy, Northeast Asia, Cross-border Trade, Strategy

Introduction

Russia has always been a close neighbour throughout Mongolian history. Equally, Mongolia occupies a special place in Russia's relations with the countries of the East. Early relations between Russia and Mongolia were established in the 17th century, which developed further incrementally, with a unique role played by Russia in the formation of an independent Mongolian state in the 20th century. Russia primarily provided diplomatic support, military and economic assistance.

An essential factor in terms of the national security of Mongolia has been its relations with two large neighbouring countries -Russia and China. The nature of this relationship can be identified in the shape of a triangle: Russia - Mongolia - China, each especially being one of the corners throughout the twentieth century. The international position of Mongolia changed radically several times during this century depending on the balance of power in East Asia, from either a strengthening or weakening of China or Russia. Until 1911 Mongolia was part of the Qing

¹ Dr Sureyya Yigit is Professor of Politics and International Relations, School of Politics and Diplomacy, New Vision University, Tbilisi, Georgia.

Empire, after which the influence of Russia was decisive. From the middle of the nineteenth century, one can notice a gradual strengthening of the role of Russia in this region, whereby Russian-Mongolian trade began to expand and the Russian consulate in Urga began to operate and increase its influence.ⁱ

The Chinese Revolution, and related to this, national liberation, are significant developments for the Mongolian people, who in 1911 achieved the creation of an independent state for Mongolia, which was determined to engage in the newly emerging international situation in the region. The declaration by Mongolia in December 1911 to secede from the Qing Empire and appeal to the Czarist Empire for support and assistance in the formation of an independent state lead quite understandably to a strengthening of Russia's position.ⁱⁱ During 1911-1915 Russian-Mongolian relations developed further and became closer, although this period was also characterised by an intense confrontation between Mongolia's two neighbouring powers.ⁱⁱⁱ

With the balance of power between Russia and China in flux, economic aid by Russia enabled Mongolia to conduct a series of economic and military reforms. The Kyakha tripartite conference of 1915 defined the status of Mongolia as an autonomous state within Republican China.^{iv} The First World War, followed by the Russian revolutions of 1917, significantly weakened the role of Russia in North-East Asia in general and Mongolia in particular. By 1919, the actual independence of Mongolia was abolished by the introduction of White forces to the nomadic country; thus, the international balance of power was upset, and China became increasingly significant alongside a rising and influential Japan.

In 1921, as a result of the national democratic revolution, national independence restored the initial independence of Mongolia, after which it implemented radical revolutions transforming its society and bringing it under significant influence of the Comintern and Soviet Russia, effectively becoming a "satellite" of the USSR.^v Thus, a small nomadic country came to be dependent on its two giant neighbours. A weakening of one of them, the exacerbation of internal problems and decentralisation processes led to strengthening the role of the northern neighbour. The Soviets held a deep revolutionary interest in all its neighbours, primarily focusing on military-strategic and economic interests within Asia. The favourable geographic position of Mongolia located in the centre of the Asian continent, the vast territory and the presence of numerous livestock as a source of agricultural raw materials for Siberia and central Russia made it highly attractive to cooperate with both in terms of trade and the military-strategic sphere.

The serious interest of the Russians in Mongolia was also determined by the unique historic role of the Mongols of the 13th – 15th centuries, namely the Mongol-Tatar invasion of Russia, the composition of the Golden Horde.^{vi} Due to its nature and resources and the events taking place both internally and within its vicinity, Mongolia became a topic that attracted the constant attention of Russia. As diplomatic relations between Russia and Mongolia began, an increase in the size of Russian-Mongolian trade also enticed greater Russian interest in Mongolia's economy and society. In 1861 a Russian consulate was established in Urga, and with the Russian-Chinese Treaty of 1881, Russia received the right of duty-free trade throughout Mongolia.^{vii} Commercial activity further developed with Russian merchants, and trading companies began to establish businesses. In 1895, the Russian-Chinese Bank was established in St. Petersburg, and in 1900 branches of this bank had opened in Urga and Ulyasutai.^{viii} More Russian consulates were opened in Ulyasutai, Kobdo, Maymachen.^{ix} This period witnessed not only the exports of Russian goods to Mongolia but also capital. Russian entrepreneurs in Urga created small factories, and a joint-stock company was organised, mining and prospecting for gold in Mongolia.^x

In Russia, by the end of the nineteenth century, a change in foreign policy concerning defensive policy in the Far East and Central Asia began to take place, which foresaw a more active, offensive dimension. The development of industry, economic development of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East stimulated modern infrastructure. In 1891, with the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway accessed for Russian traders and business circles, the markets of the countries of East Asia.^{xi} The conclusion with Qing China of a contract for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a lease for 25 years of a military base in Port Arthur testified to the strengthening of the position of Russia in the Far East.^{xii}

Therefore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Russian diplomacy was faced with a difficult task: to ensure the defence of the national interests of Russia, but without drawing it into military conflicts. The weakening of the Qing Empire became an arena of rivalry between the great European powers such as the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and Russia. The results of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905 demonstrated that the region included a rising new strong power: Japan. According to the Russian-Japanese Agreement of 1907, the Japanese government recognised special interests in Outer Mongolia.^{xiii} Russia, in turn, recognised the Japanese interests concerning southern Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, as well as a Japanese protectorate in Korea.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Qing government of China had strengthened its colonisation of Mongol lands complemented by the military, administrative and trading expansion. Incrementally the occupation of border Mongol territories began with Chinese merchants leading the penetration, who quickly took over the Mongolian market.^{xiv} For the Chinese, the colonist was primarily a Chinese official administrator and a Chinese soldier. Russia's policy was determined by an interest in the Mongolian trading opportunities, expanding Russian interests, establishing a presence against possible Japanese aggression, and Chinese capital's economic pressure. Russian capital and Siberian merchants were also attracted to the Mongolian market, specifically interested in cheap Mongolian raw materials such as wool, leather and meat, as well as lucrative opportunities to export their industrial products.^{xv}

On the Mongolian market, greater competition was generated by Western industrial goods, which Chinese traders sold. The dynamic development of the Russian economy at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries allowed more significant support for education, culture and science. Improving the educational system and the development of science led to significant scientific and technical developments. Russia supported geographical research focusing on Central Asia, notably through Przhevalsky, Roborovsky, Potanin and Kozlov.^{xvi} The establishment and activity of the Imperial Geographical Society and its branches in Siberia contributed to the scientific research on Mongolia.^{xvii} The events that took place in Mongolia during the restoration of national independence and related changes in Russian-Mongolian relations, discussion and preparation of the Russian-Chinese trade agreement in 1911 led to an unprecedented interest in Mongolia in the most diverse strata of Russian society.^{xviii}

Interest in Russia, however, acquired a more practical direction associated with Mongolia. Various members of the Russian elite: political and military leaders, representatives of diplomacy, academics and commercial circles, journalists and scholars investigated the various characteristics of the state of the Russian-Mongolian relationships. In specific ways in socio-political thought, Russia formulated a "Mongolian question".^{xix} Mongolia's direct appeal to the Russian Empire for diplomatic support and economic assistance and the arrival of the Mongolian delegation to St. Petersburg forced the Czarist elite, primarily Russian government circles and representatives of various political parties, to determine what their attitude to the "Mongolian issue" was. According to some, Mongolia needed to be tied to Russia and transformed into a colony.^{xx} Others suggested creating a buffer state which would be dependent on Russia.^{xxi} Still, others believed it was a mistake to interfere in the internal affairs of Mongolia and believed in the necessity of creating an independent Mongolian state.^{xxii} In Russia, social

and political thought reflected the entire spectrum of ideological views, party political directions, including the Octobrists, Cadets, Monarchists and Social Democrats.^{xxiii}

Quite naturally, the "Mongolian question" was not the main external political issue for the public throughout the empire which was embroiled in complex international relations both in the West and East. However, the Mongolian question as an integral part of Far Eastern policy and relations with China increased the importance of Mongolia, especially with regard to bilateral trading relations. Perhaps throughout the entire century since then, there has never been such a deep and wide interest within Russian socio-political thought concerning the Mongolian question, as at the beginning of the twentieth century, especially after 1911. This period witnessed a conspicuous surge in the release of literature on Mongolia, Russian-Mongolian-Chinese relations, and perspectives on how to develop these relationships.^{xxiv}

Thus, the formation of Russian-Mongolian relations at the beginning of the 20th century took place in a complex system of international relations in East Asia, in the system of relations between China, Russia, Japan and Mongolia. During this period, there was a manifest increase in attention towards Outer Mongolia from China and Russia, fueled by the inevitable trading rivalry between Russian and Chinese merchants. The deterrence factor of Russia in Mongolia could be seen through the obligations made under the Russian-Japanese agreements of 1907, 1910 and 1912, which defined the spheres of influence in the region.^{xxv} The increasingly complicated international situation around Mongolia stimulated widespread discussion of the Mongolian question in the government circles of Russia and the pages of scientific and periodicals.^{xxvi} This was significantly intensified in connection with the revision of the Russian-Chinese trade agreements in 1911 and the proclamation of Outer Mongolia in December 1911 of its political independence. The "Mongolian question" came to be discussed in the Russian State Duma with several major Meetings held in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Irkutsk to study the Mongolian market, organising several trade expeditions to Mongolia.^{xxvii}

The formulation of Russia's policy concerning Mongolia took place in the struggle and compromise of various tendencies determined by political forces and leading departments, namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the military.^{xxviii} Foreign policy in the empire was determined by attempts to resolve the emerging contradictions between the diplomatic department and trade industrial circles, between central and regional administration, various levels of local administration, and representatives of the military department. Thus, in the discussion of Russian-Mongolian relations and the "Mongolian

question", the following main directions can be identified: assessments of diplomats and statesmen of Russia, characteristics of military specialists, representatives of commerce and industry, academics and the intelligentsia.^{xxix}

Analysis of the assessments of Russian diplomats such as Foreign Minister Sazonov on the "Mongolian Question", a series of Russian-Mongolian-Chinese agreements during 1911-1915 suggested a strict and restrained diplomatic line to be pursued by Russia in Mongolia.^{xxx} Russia strove to maintain peaceful relations with Republican China, fulfil the secret points of the Russian-Japanese agreements on the delimitation of spheres of influence, and support the independence of the development of Outer Mongolia.^{xxxi} Russia could not support the complete independence of Outer Mongolia with the annexation of Inner Mongolia.^{xxxii} Russian diplomacy directed all its efforts to create an autonomous Mongolia and recognise Russia's special rights in Outer Mongolia. Russia was in a difficult situation since, on the one hand, she needed to limit the aspirations of the Mongols to create a "Greater Mongolia" and, on the other side, persuade China to make concessions, show flexibility and recognise the autonomy of Mongolia.^{xxxiii} Thanks to a flexible policy, diplomats managed to create an autonomous, and in fact, independent Mongolia. During 1910-1916 Foreign Minister Sazonov considered Russia a European power with active external politics in Europe and the Middle East and opposed increasing Russian possessions in Asia.^{xxxiv}

At a meeting of the State Duma on April 13-27, 1912, polar points of view on the problem of the prospects for Russian-Mongolian relations were evident.^{xxxv} Sazonov and Milyukov advocated only for a mediating role between Mongolia and China and against involvement in internal activities of Mongolian affairs, whereas others considered it necessary to annex Mongolia to Russia.^{xxxvi} Sazonov opposed the complete separation of Mongolia from China, considering it not ready for independent political development, which would also burden Russia to create a viable state with corresponding financial obligations, time, and effort.^{xxxvii}

Sazonov did not consider the annexation of Mongolia to Russia a valuable acquisition, as it could lead to an undesirable significant shift in the centre of gravity within the state and, accordingly, to the weakening of Russia's positions in Europe and the Middle East. To not be drawn too deeply into the East and Mongol affairs, it was best for Russia to undertake the role of a mediator. Opposing views centred on the belief that Mongolia should become a buffer state that would cover the eastern borders of Russia.^{xxxviii} Emperor Nicholas II also influenced the

practical solution of the "Mongolian question" with his preference for imperial territorial expansion.^{xxxix}

In this respect, a special place in the study of Russian-Mongolian relations was reserved for military analyses. Mongolia and Northeastern China were studied as possible theatres of military operations, the military potential of neighbouring states. They possessed valuable scientific information about the country, received during unique expeditions, and critical analysis of scientific literature about Mongolia, detailing information concerning cities, history, climate, religion, and trade and transport routes.^{xl}

The military focused on the threat to Russia from China and Japan coming from the East, threatening the tranquillity of Russia and Europe, believing it to carry the seeds of destruction of European civilisation and culture. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, active colonisation in Manchuria and Mongolia took place through Chinese and Japanese railroad construction projects and roads.^{xli} Moreover, the modernisation of Chinese troops was testified by the opinions of the military concerning the threat of the invasion of China and Japan in the Siberian region. Therefore, helping the Mongols build their autonomous state, relocating the Russian army to the edge of the Gobi desert would create a buffer zone and avoid a military collision with China. The results of the General Staff research became a valuable source of information about Mongolia, and their influence was very significant, although not decisive. They fueled the direction in foreign policy of taking an active hard stance in this region.^{xlii} While there is a possibility that army specialists somewhat exaggerated the military threat posed by China in favour of a strict policy towards this eastern neighbour, they alerted Russia to a relationship fraught with military conflicts and diplomatic complications. At the initial outset, it was Russian-Mongolian trade relations which played a prominent role in relations between the two countries.^{xliii}

The forecasted increase in Russian exports to Mongolia not being realized caused anxiety among the commercial and industrial circles of central Russia. In 1909 and 1910, at the Moscow Exchange Committee, meetings of Moscow industrialists were held, which discussed the problems of trade with China and Mongolia. Essential roles in the study of Russian-Mongolian trade were the two trade expeditions to Mongolia: One was Moscow led with Colonel Popov, equipped with industrialists, another was a Siberian expedition from Tomsk.^{xliv} The approaches of these two expeditions to the problem and their conclusions differed significantly.^{xlv} The Moscow trade expedition recognised the importance of the Mongolian market for Russia,

although it could not foresee many prospects of Russian trade in Mongolia.^{xlvi} The businessmen and traders of central Russia saw their economic interests tied more closely with the further developed markets of the Middle East and Manchuria.

The Siberian expedition, headed by professors Bogolev and Sobolev, gave a more profound economic analysis of the state of Russian-Mongolian trade.^{xlvii} They considered Mongolia a promising market for Russian goods; therefore, it was far better to strengthen the Russians' trading positions.^{xlviii} Representatives of the intelligentsia suggested a different interpretation of the situation from the military and merchants concerning Mongolia. They also encouraged the creation of an independent Mongolia, a buffer state which would become a part of a union of European states. These views were reflected in the publication of leading Mongolologists of Russia such as the liberal populist Popov, linguist and ethnographer Evstafiev, official and local historian Pershin, the future the famous Mongolian scholar Burdukov, and a graduate of the Eastern Institute in Vladivostok, Bobrik.^{xliv} Despite the difference in details, they advocated the creation of an independent Mongolian state or buffer state.

They advocated for Russia to provide genuine assistance to Mongolia. As vital to reviving the Mongolian state, they considered supporting the establishment of the economy of the Mongolian nomads, assisting in the further development of trade relations.^l Particular attention should be focused on the need for assistance in the field of cultural and health care.^{li} The Social Democrats occupied a particular position in the "Mongolian question". They based their position on class positions, on criticism of the colonial and conquest policies of the Tsarist government in the backward countries of the East, including in Mongolia.^{lii} The Social Democrats did not show tremendous and deep interest in Mongolia and the policy of Russia in the region. The absence of a working class in the country, the insignificant Mongolian role in the world economy and politics, and weak awareness of events in a nomadic country became important pointers concerning the characteristics and assessments of the "Mongolian question". Moreover, it was only the Chinese Revolution and the aggravation of Mongolia-Chinese relations increased their interest in this problem. In terms of historiography, the Bolsheviks quickly and calmly turned Mongolia into a zone of influence and spreading revolutionary ideas.^{liii}

At the end of World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist States (USSR), as a victorious party, achieved the international recognition of Mongolia, which became a loyal ally for the entire period of the Cold War, supporting all its initiatives in the international arena.^{liv} After the

collapse of the USSR, the new Russian leadership warmed much more to the West in expectation of more profitable foreign economic partners. With the socialist system collapsing rapidly, Mongolia, experiencing many internal problems in its socio-economic and political life, found itself without the support of its long-term ally. Relations between Mongolia and Russia entered a stagnation period and culminated in the near curtailment of bilateral contacts.

This state of bilateral relations lasted for around a decade, during which significant changes took place in Mongolia itself, especially concerning its foreign policy. The Mongolian leadership overcame the negative socio-economic trends and political obstacles and demonstrated the ability to move forward both in domestic and foreign policy, as a result of which a new type of Mongolian statehood arose. In 1992, Mongolia adopted a new Constitution, which laid down the legal foundations for a new political system and market economy; and a multi-party system was finally proclaimed.^{lv}

In its Preamble and first Article, the Constitution declared:^{lvi}

We, the people of Mongolia:

- consolidating and strengthening the independence and sovereignty of our state,
- respecting and upholding the human rights and freedom, justice, and unity of our nation,
- inheriting and cherishing the traditions of our statehood, history and culture,
- considering and respecting the accomplishments of human civilisation,
- shall aspire to the supreme goal of building and developing a humane, civic and democratic society in our motherland.

Thus, do hereby proclaim and declare this Constitution of Mongolia to the entire populace.

Article 1

1. Mongolia is an independent and sovereign Republic.
2. Securing democracy, justice, freedom, equality, national unity and respecting the rule of law are the fundamental principles of the State activities.

Therefore, according to this Constitution, Mongolia is an independent, sovereign state based on the principles of democracy, justice, freedom, equality, ensuring national harmony, and respect for the law. Thus, a new Mongolia began to build relations with other states, not on an ideological basis but an equal, mutually beneficial basis.

Mongolia began to integrate into the new system of international relations and the world economy while possessing a vast and rich reserve of natural resources; hence it came as no surprise to witness that Mongolia did not remain alone for long. Western companies flocked to Mongolia, offering lucrative contracts and investments in the development of Mongolian natural resources.^{lvii} At the turn of the 21st century, Mongolia's standing in international relations had increased dramatically. Equally, Russia once again realised the significance of Mongolia and began to turn eastward and limit the missed political and economic gains from having loosened relations with its recent ally.

With the election of Vladimir Putin as President of Russia in 2000, Russia set out to strengthen the eastern vector of its foreign policy.^{lviii} At the highest level, Russia began to make efforts to restore its relations with Ulaanbaatar. Nevertheless, it was not easy to return to the previous state of relations, since in a short time, Mongolia had established a beneficial cooperative relationship with China, the USA, South Korea, Turkey, Japan, Canada and other economically developed countries. The Russian Federation realised soon after that this country which occupied an important strategic position in the depths of Inner Asia, was turning into an arena of open and hidden political and economic rivalry between such actors as itself, China, the United States, Japan, the EU, Turkey, Great Britain, Canada, South Korea, and others.

The relevance of Mongolia and the pivot to the Pacific idea by Moscow was definitely affected by the continued advancement of NATO forces up to the borders of Russia and the continuation of Western economic sanctions.^{lix} This encouraged Russia to develop further cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) in order to connect Siberia and the Far East to the economic and political integration processes of the APR.^{lx} In such a measure, Mongolia could become one of the strong points, a hub, particularly a transit country for the development of trade, economic, humanitarian, logistic, and energy cooperation with the rest of the APR countries.

It has been asserted that Mongolia, due to its possession of vast reserves of natural resources, requires Russian energy resources, which is extremely promising for Russia in terms of economic cooperation.^{lxi} According to the World Bank, Mongolia's GDP grew by a phenomenal

17.3% a decade ago in 2011 and by 12.3% the very next year.^{lxii} Although the next decade did not fulfil this promise as it included a slowdown in GDP growth rates, cooperation with Russia remained very promising for Mongolia. In the updated Foreign Policy Concept adopted in 2011, Mongolia adopted the principle of balanced relations with Russia and China as the basis of its foreign policy. It proclaimed the concept of a "third neighbour" represented by the United States, Japan, South Korea, Turkey and others as a guarantee of sovereignty.^{lxiii} The aforementioned countries remain active in the development of co-cooperation with Mongolia.

Table: 1 Mongolia's Exports 2019

	Trade (US\$ Mil)	Partner share (%)
China	2,037	33.24
Russian Federation	1,730	28.23
Japan	585	9.56
USA	290	4.73

Source: World Bank (n.d.). Mongolia trade. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/MNG>

At the same time, the Mongolian leadership understood the difficulties in maintaining a balance in relations both with neighbours on the one side and with economically developed and politically democratic states on the other. As shown in Table 1, Russia was no longer the most critical trading partner for Mongolia. For example, in terms of the total volume of foreign trade, China accounted for 88.88% in 2019 whereas Russia was 0.89%, the Chinese market as a whole amounting to \$6,773 Million, whereas Russia being limited to \$68 Million.^{lxiv} At the same time, there is reason to believe that Mongolia can build a mutually beneficial strategic partnership with Russia even in the current challenging conditions of building a new world order. Initiating a balanced development of bilateral relations, Russia could provide Mongolia with sizeable political and diplomatic support to further upkeep the Mongolian state and extend bilateral relations. One can assert that Russia, traditionally having strategic interests in Mongolia, is likely to make noteworthy efforts to keep Mongolia as an advantageous political and economic partner and reliable neighbour.

Bilateral relations began to decline in the early 1990s before the strategic partnership began in 2016.^{lxv} Therefore, one must identify the factors that influenced their development and outline

possible prospects. Initially, three stages can be distinguished in relations between Russia and Mongolia: the first stage from 1990-1993, which can be characterised as a period of decline; the second stage between 1993-1999 regarded as a period of partial recovery and stabilisation; the third stage from 2000 to the present is the development of good-neighbourly relations advancing onto a strategic partnership. Each of these stages was caused by both objective and subjective reasons and required scientific understanding to identify its content, problems, and prospects for restoring strong and good-neighbourly relations in the interests of both countries.

Initial Stage: Severe Decline

The first stage of relations from 1990-1993 was the most painful and sensitive for both countries. During this period, not only did both regimes collapse, but the whole socialist camp broke down, which led to the elites of both countries being determined to get rid of ideological filters and build international relations based on shared human values and mutual benefit. The early 1990s significantly undermined Russian-Mongolian relations. Such a development was due to the domestic political developments in both countries. As a result, there was a sharp decline in the intensity of Russian-Mongolian relations. This period was characterised by a decline in relations in all areas, especially in trade and economic and the cultural, scientific, military.^{lxvi} Not surprisingly, Moscow halted aid, which previously accounted for 37% subsidisation of the Mongolian annual budget.^{lxvii}

In February 1991, the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic signed a Declaration of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Cooperation, in which both sides proclaimed a mutual rejection of ideological approaches to issues of bilateral relations.^{lxviii} The signing of the declaration testified that the countries had abandoned the ideological component in their mutual relations, and from that time on, pragmatism and mutual benefit became the main pillars in the relations between the two countries. During 1991-1993 several intergovernmental agreements were signed, including an agreement on trade and economic cooperation, on the creation of the Mongolian-Russian intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation.^{lxix} Throughout this period, Mongolia experienced a severe economic crisis, from which it was able to re-emerge thanks to the successful implementation of radical economic reforms and foreign donor assistance.^{lxx}

Stage Two: Stabilisation

Nevertheless, under these conditions, a momentous event that affected bilateral relations was the official visit to Moscow in January 1993 of Mongolian President Ochirbat. The fundamental Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Mongolia was signed.^{lxxi} According to this agreement, Mongolia and Russia agreed through Article 1 that the parties considered each other as friendly states and will be guided in their relations by the principles of respect for sovereignty and independence, sovereign equality, non-use of force or threat of force, inviolability of borders, territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equality and the right of peoples to dispose of their own destiny, conscientious fulfilment of obligations, good neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation.^{lxxii}

The new treaty replaced the 1966 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that had been in force earlier. It was a fundamentally new treaty built on new principles of relations. This new treaty foresaw a new model of genuinely equal cooperation between two neighbouring countries. It must be recalled that an essential factor that predetermined the conclusion of the 1993 Treaty was the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia, which, did in a certain sense, bring it out from under the Russian security umbrella, but at the same time allowed the improvement of relations with China and ability to act in the international arena with initiatives that were of particular importance for maintaining peace and security.^{lxxiii} This agreement became the basis for the conclusion of all subsequent agreements in various fields and put bilateral relations on the path of stabilisation.

Over the next few years, several intergovernmental agreements were concluded, including those on military-technical cooperation, on border checkpoints, simplified communication across the Russian-Mongolian state border, on the protection and use of transboundary waters, on cultural and scientific cooperation, on the avoidance of double taxation concerning taxes on income and property, on the conditions of mutual trips of citizens, on cooperation in the field of geological exploration and development of subsoil.^{lxxiv} The legal and regulatory framework began to gradually form and improve, creating other fertile grounds for cooperation.

By the second half of the 1990s, contacts at all levels had significantly expanded. In 1995, President Ochirbat took part in the celebrations in Moscow on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War; in December 1999, the new President of Mongolia, Natsagiin Bagabandi, paid an official visit to Moscow; in 1999, a delegation of the Russian Federation Council headed by Varnavsky, head of the Russian Foreign Ministry Ivanov

visited Mongolia, and in July 1999, his Mongolian colleague Nyam-Osoryn Tuyaa visited Russia.^{lxxv} During the second half of the 1990s, economic relations had significantly expanded and intensified.

Stage Three: Recovery

The third stage was essentially a turning point in relations between Mongolia and Russia, during which good-neighbourly relations began to develop into strategic ones, which was assisted by the election in March 2000 of Vladimir Putin as President of the Russian Federation.^{lxxvi} By this time, the Russian leadership realised the need to strengthen the eastern vector of its foreign policy, including restoring relations with Mongolia. It is important to note that one of Putin's earliest foreign trips as President was to visit Mongolia on 13 November 2000. The visit was short but intense where Putin met with the President of Mongolia, Natsagiin Bagabandi, with the Chairman of the State Great Khural Lhamsurengiin and Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar.^{lxxvii} At the end of the visit, the Russian President laid a wreath at the monument to Soviet soldiers on Mount Zaisan, erected in honour of the victory of Mongolian and Soviet troops at Khalkhin Gol in 1939.^{lxxviii}

The main result of this visit was the adoption of the “Ulan Bator Declaration”. In this document, Mongolia and Russia stated the commonality or similarity of approaches to critical problems of the time; both sides spoke in favour of building up interaction in world affairs, for closer cooperation in the UN and other international organisations, in particular, for strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against international terrorism, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the UN, carrying out a rational reform of the UN Security Council.^{lxxix} The declaration identified a wide range of issues on which both sides agreed to mutually beneficial cooperation, including trade and economic, military, cultural and humanitarian.

Thus, the Ulan Bator Declaration became the second important general political document concluded between Russia and Mongolia after the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation. The declaration secured the transition to a qualitatively new level of contacts between Russia and Mongolia and also contributed to the successful solution of several thorny issues, primarily the sizeable unpaid debt of Soviet loans granted to Mongolia. There were different opinions in Mongolia about the origin of Mongolia's enormous debt to the USSR, but it was clear that such a problem was an obstacle to the further development of relations.^{lxxx}

Mongolia's debt to Russia was very worrying in the years after independence, especially in the early 2000s. One view concerned that the solution to this issue would be for Russia to meet its southern neighbour halfway since the amount of debt was more than twice the country's GDP at that time, and Mongolia was unable to pay it off. The matter was finally resolved in 2004 whereby Mongolia made a payment of less than \$300 million, in return for which a massive Soviet debt of \$ 11.4 billion was written off.^{lxxxii} This was almost all of the debt accounting for 97% of the total. Six years later, "as a result of bilateral negotiations held in July 2010, the sides managed to reach an agreement, under which Mongolia undertook to repay financial obligations worth 163.7 million convertible rubles and 10.5 million clearing US dollars with a lump sum payment of \$3.8 million" to settle the entire debt.^{lxxxiii}

The adoption of the Ulan Bator Declaration contributed to the further development of the regulatory framework of relations. Thus, several intergovernmental agreements were concluded: on cooperation on the peaceful use of atomic energy, on the principles of cooperation between the executive authorities of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local administrations of Mongolia, on cooperation in tourism, on the provision of military-technical assistance to Mongolia free of charge, on mutual recognition of educational documents, academic degrees and academic titles.^{lxxxiv} After resolving the debt problem, Russian positions in Mongolia began to gradually strengthen, with the practice of exchanging high-level visits resuming.^{lxxxv} A notable visit took place in April 2000, when the Secretary of the National Security Council of Mongolia Ravdangiin Bold paid a visit to Moscow; in September of the same year, his Russian colleague Ivanov returned the visit.^{lxxxvi}

Table: 2 Official Visits by Mongolian Presidents to Russia

President	Years
Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat	1998
Natsagiin Bagabandi	1999, 2005
Nambaryn Enkhbayar	2006, 2008
Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj	2010, 2011, 2015
Khaltmaagiin Battulga	2017, 2018, 2019

Source: Open Sources

Parliamentary ties also developed alongside the improvement of military cooperation between the two countries.^{lxxxvii} It should be noted that given the long-term presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Mongolia, which complicated Mongolia's relations with China, modern

Mongolia approached the issue of military cooperation with other states very carefully. Pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, Mongolia, nevertheless, in the 1992 Constitution enshrined the following principle in Article 4: "Stationing of foreign troops in the territory of Mongolia or admitting over the state border to traverse shall be prohibited without enactment of a law."^{lxxxvii} This did not exclude the possibility of developing military ties with other states to ensure Mongolia's security, which included Russia.^{lxxxviii} As seen in Table: 2, the practice of high-level meetings continued in subsequent years.^{lxxxix}

A significant milestone in developing strategic relations between the two countries was the state visit of the President of Mongolia Nambaryn Enkhbayar to Moscow in December 2006.^{xc} During this visit, several intergovernmental agreements were concluded to diversify relations in various fields and improve the legal framework. However, the main result of the visit was the signing of the "Moscow Declaration", in which all the previously reached agreements were confirmed.^{xc} The document stated the desire of the parties to seek to improve the efficiency and scale of interaction in the spirit of a strategic partner state, which presupposed taking relations to an even higher and qualitatively new level. It is essential to state here that both sides had declared their desire to move forward along the path of strategic partnership.

The strategic nature of relations was consolidated in August 2009 during the visit of Russian President Medvedev to Ulaanbaatar by signing the "Declaration on the Development of Strategic Partnership" between Russia and Mongolia.^{xcii} The parties expressed their readiness for closer cooperation in such strategically important areas as transport infrastructure, cooperation in all types of energy resources, and cooperation in agriculture and cross-border trade. One must underline the fact that all three of the above-mentioned declarations define the strategy of the Mongolian-Russian partnership, namely: the intensification of cooperation in all areas, the all-round strengthening of political ties, an increase in trade turnover, the growth of investment projects, the development and implementation of long-term programs in the economy, science and culture, the expansion of cross-border cooperation and regional integration. One should also note that these declarations, along with the 1993 Treaty and more than 130 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements concluded after 1993, have become a stable legal basis for the development of bilateral relations.

After the Medvedev visit in 2009, President Putin, on 3 September 2014, contributed to the deepening and intensification of the strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and Mongolia.^{xciii} His visit was timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of the victory of the

Soviet and Mongolian troops on the Khalkhin-Gol River over the Japanese. Honouring the memory of Soviet and Mongolian soldiers, Putin reiterated the shared historical memory, heroic comradeship of the past, forming a sound basis for building modern Russian-Mongolian relations in the spirit of mutual respect, trust and friendship.

As a result of Putin's negotiations with the President of Mongolia, Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, 15 intergovernmental, interdepartmental and sectoral agreements were signed. Among them: Agreement between the Ministry of Roads and Transport of Mongolia and JSC Russian Railways on strategic partnership for the modernisation and development of the Ulaanbaatar Railway (UBZhD), Memorandum between the Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Economic Development of Mongolia on cooperation in the development of Russian-Mongolian economic relations, the Memorandum of Understanding between Aeroflot and MIAT - Mongolian Airlines, providing for the expansion of cooperation in the field of civil aviation and the air route network.^{xciv}

Cross-Border Cooperation: Buryatia

When focusing closely on the history of Russian-Mongolian cross-border cooperation, both entities have centuries of experience in political, trade and economic and cultural interaction. Outer Mongolia or Northern Mongolia (Khalkha) since 1691 became part of the Chinese Qing Empire.^{xcv} In establishing Russian-Mongolian ties, a unique role was played by Eastern Siberia. The development of Russian-Mongolian relations was based on treaties between the Russian Empire and China – Nerchinsky (1689), Burinsky and Kyakhtinsky (1727).^{xcvi} By including Mongolia in the Qing Empire, the Manchus created a particular system of government on its territory. Mongolia was inundated with Chinese merchants who controlled the market. Chinese merchants were represented here by large firms that, for their part, exerted intense pressure on the Chinese government, demanding the prevention of Russian merchants from entering Mongolia. An important role in bilateral relations was also played by Russian merchants interested in the Mongolian market.^{xcvii}

The main competition for Russian merchants in the Mongolian market was Chinese traders who imported goods from Western countries and acted as intermediaries of foreign firms. Russian-Chinese trade went mainly through the "eastern gate" to Asia - the trading settlement of Kyakhta.^{xcviii} This main trading centre in Eastern Siberia accounted for a majority of commodity turnover of Russia with Asian countries. Before the opening of seaports and the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Kyakhta road was the main transit point of the Great Tea

Route.^{xcix} On the other side of the border, three kilometres from Kyakhta, in the city of Maimacheng, the bulk of Russian-Chinese and Russian-Mongolian trade took place.^c In 1921, after the city's capture by units of the Mongolian People's Army under the command of Sukhbaatar, its name was changed to Altanbulag and became one of the centres of revolutionary forces.^{ci}

After Mongolia achieved independence, the Russian-Mongolian trade was regulated by the Russian-Mongolian agreement of 1912.^{cii} The Mongolian government provided Russian merchants with the rights and advantages listed in the attached trade protocol and pledged not to provide other foreign subjects with greater rights than those enjoyed by the Russians. In other words, the Russian-Mongolian agreement of 1912 and the protocol favoured Russian trade as much as possible, which led to its noticeable growth. It should be recalled, however, that Russian-Mongolian relations passed through difficult stages of formation and development. In the pre-revolutionary period, Russia provided assistance to promote Mongolia in maintaining its independence, and in Soviet times acted in the role of patron, provided military, material and financial assistance to the fraternal Republic. During the Soviet era, foreign trade and economic relations were thoroughly planned from the union centre.

In the early 1990s in foreign policy, there was a certain underestimation of its eastern direction and weakening attention to relationships with traditional friendly partners. In the post-socialist period, the reorientation towards cross-border cooperation was caused by the curtailment of interstate labour and a natural reaction to the economic crisis. Respectively the primary role in the preservation and development of cooperation had to be played by the local regions of Siberia.^{ciii}

Only at the end of the last decade of the twentieth century did the ties between Russia and Mongolia start to revive, building on the principles of equality. The bulk of trade between Russia and Mongolia fell on the Irkutsk region, the Trans-Baikal Territory, the Republic of Buryatia, Altai and Tuva.^{civ} Representative offices worked in close cooperation with trade and industry chambers and embassies of Russia and Mongolia. Particular attention was paid to the representatives of border regions of Russia concerning the problems of strengthening the material base and increasing transport capacity; as there were 29 checkpoints on the Russian-Mongolian border, formerly only 5 were the main ones: in Kyakhta, Shara Sume, Tsagaan Tolgoit, Khandagaite and Tashanthe.^{cv} Thus, modern Russian-Mongolian relations are

developing progressively and trending towards a qualitatively new level of an all-encompassing strategic partnership.

At the same time, it should be noted that significant obstacles to the development of Russian-Mongolian are a phenomenal imbalance in mutual trade, high customs duties and fees, transportation costs, various sanitary and veterinary restrictions for some Mongolian export goods.^{cvi} Under these conditions, Ulaanbaatar's view is for Russia to go beyond the declarative nature of bilateral relations and take tangible steps and intensify efforts in the political, trade, economic, educational and cultural and humanitarian spheres.

Buryatia has long-standing historical ties with Mongolia, which have been developed to deepen trade and economic cooperation between the Republic of Buryatia and Mongolia since the 2000s.^{cvi} Cooperation between the Republic of Buryatia and Mongolia is carried out within the framework of bilateral agreements between the two countries.

Table: 3 Mongolian Exports to Russia (2019)

	Value \$ Millions
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and cement	49.43
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products	10.39
Articles of apparel, knit or crocheted	2.98
Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers	1.07
Wool, animal hair, horsehair yarn and fabric	0.784

Source: Trading Economics. (n.d.). Mongolia exports to Russia. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from

<https://tradingeconomics.com/mongolia/exports/russia>

Table: 4 Mongolian Imports from Russia (2019)

	Value \$ Millions
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products	1,150
Iron and steel	74.02
Aircraft, spacecraft	50.0
Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers	49.37
Fertilisers	38.07

Source: Trading Economics. (n.d.). Mongolia imports from Russia. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from

<https://tradingeconomics.com/mongolia/imports/russia>

Cross-border cooperation is carried out in traditional spheres: foreign trade, investment cooperation, joint activities in agriculture, environmental protection, tourism and sports, education and science, culture and healthcare. The main imports from Mongolia are meat and food offal.^{cviii} The structure of Buryat exports to Mongolia fits in with the general Russian exports identified in Table: 3, represented by food products, engineering products: aircraft, equipment and electrical machines.^{cxix} Foreign trade cooperation with Mongolia is diverse as Table: 4 demonstrates a wide range of trade and economic relations between the two countries. The Republic of Buryatia and Mongolia gives much importance to develop trade and economic cooperation to interstate meetings.^{cx} These involve not only non-governmental structures but also business barter and public figures.^{cxii}

However, trade and economic relations between the Republic of Buryatia and Mongolia are varied, including a wide range of supplies and products. The export deliveries of the Republic of Buryatia to Mongolia make up the supply of fish, bread products and flour confectionery products and breeding cattle. A priority area in developing cooperation to promote from Mongolia to the Republic of Belarus remains beef and horse meat supply. Such endeavours give credence to the assertion that foreign trade cooperation with Mongolia is actively developing, especially in recent years.^{cxiii} A limiting factor in the supply of raw meat from Mongolia today is also the high cost of Mongolian meat.^{cxiiii}

The main problem in cross-border cooperation between the Republic of Buryatia and Mongolia today is health fears. Mongolia is considered a risk factor regarding ofru, brucellosis, anthrax, goat pox, glanders, equine infectious anaemia, cattle tuberculosis.^{cxv} Existing restrictions on imports from Mongolia cattle, horses, and small ruminants due to high epizootic risks cannot be cancelled until the epizootic situation stabilises. The main focus in the development of trade and economic cooperation is to solve issues of promoting Buryat manufacturers' products to the Mongolian market.

Since the late 1990s, bilateral relations have been based on new principles of equal partnership. Currently, bilateral relations have been brought to a new level of comprehensive strategic partnership. In this regard, the border areas are to carry out a special mission to establish an effective interstate natural interaction and cooperation. As a border region, Buryatia has a long history based on economic, political, cultural, humanitarian ties. Investigating the trade and economic cooperation between Mongolia and the region demonstrates a high potential for trade and economic development and investment cooperation. Particular attention for both sides in

terms of opportunities for investment and cooperation concerns the creation at the Russian-Mongolian border, the free trade zone Altanbulag.^{cxv} Built on the legendary Maimacheng of the 18th century, Altanbulag in the future has the potential to become a pole of growth of the national economy and the border regions of Siberia. Favourable geographical position at the intersection of transit routes from Asia to Europe and the development of Russian-Mongolian trade relations has lent credibility to consider it a free trade zone prototype. One of the promising areas for development is tourism, part of a cooperation between Mongolia and Buryatia; another is to further develop cooperation in the educational sphere.^{cxvi}

However, there are obstacles to practical cross-border cooperation. The cooperation of Buryatia and Mongolia is limited by the narrowness of the range of export goods, high customs tariffs for traditional export goods, high phytosanitary and veterinary requirements for the export of Mongolian meat production, and the competition of Buryatia with other Russian regions.^{cxvii} In order to be successful, it is necessary to save the accumulated potential and move forward, be actively involved in the process interaction at the interstate and regional levels, and actively develop horizontal links between aimags - districts, cities, cultures and cultures educational institutions.

Conclusion

Concerning bilateral relations, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, at a joint news conference following talks with his Mongolian counterpart Battsetseg in Moscow on 1 June 2021, stated the "mutual resolve to continue strengthening our ties in the spirit of the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which our presidents signed in Ulaanbaatar in September 2019."^{cxviii} Whilst encouraging the activities of the Russian-Mongolian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, previous successful cooperation in the technical and exploration fields were also highlighted when Lavrov noted the "40th anniversary of the joint Soviet-Mongolian space mission. Immediately after this news conference, we will hold a ceremony to present the Order of Alexander Nevsky to pilot-cosmonaut Jugderdemidiin Gurragchaa, President of the Mongolia-Russia Friendship Society, Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Mongolia." Issues relating to security cooperation affecting the SCO, OSCE and other Asian forums were also discussed with economic matters being emphasized, Lavrov declaring that "Talks are underway between Mongolia and the Eurasian Economic Commission on the possible signing of a free trade zone agreement, which will help boost our economic ties."^{cxix}

The very next month Lavrov in his address concerning Russia's International Activities for Russian Regions' Development in Vladivostok on 8 July 2021, made public that the "EAEU and China are now discussing projects that can form the backbone of the Greater Eurasian Partnership. I'm talking about economic corridors that will help reinvigorate the region and lift up entire industries. We will see this fairly soon as the Russia - Mongolia - China corridor becomes a reality."^{cxix} Referring to the Far Eastern region, Lavrov reiterated that "One of the main priorities for our diplomacy is using the large-scale potential of the Asia-Pacific Region to boost the comprehensive development of the Russian Far East and improve the well-being of local residents. In accordance with the presidential instructions, the Government of the Russian Federation is taking systemic measures to enhance the role of the Far Eastern Federal District as an economic hub for interaction with the countries in the region and is doing its best to ensure the largest possible practical effect from international cooperation. We have been pursuing this line at APEC, which held its summit meeting at FEFU in 2012. The spread of the coronavirus has certainly taken its toll on the efforts to implement investment opportunities in the Russian Far East. However, the progress made in recent years, including as regards the "priority development areas," the open port of Vladivostok and special economic zones, allows us to move forward with confidence. The Asia-Pacific countries are participating in energy and transport programmes, and are also investing in healthcare, food and chemical industry projects. The volume of transit cargo hauled via the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Northern Sea Route is growing. Scientific and academic ties are expanding, and the University is well aware of all this. Almost two-thirds of the foreign direct investment attracted to the Russian Far East comes from China. This includes over 50 projects in a whole variety of fields. We are trying to maximise the use of these investments for breakthrough projects in order to increase our competitiveness."^{cxxi}

The year 2021 marks the centenary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Mongolia. The two statements made by Lavrov demonstrate that in this anniversary year, Moscow foresees closer collaboration and cooperation. Economically speaking, Russia is no longer the dominant partner Mongolia cherished during the Cold War. Nor is it the military superpower vying for global preeminence. Its cultural impact is also on the wane in Mongolian society, which has become more globalised and been introduced to regions and languages beyond the Russo-sphere.

Nevertheless, from the moment of the proclamation of independence from the Qing Empire in 1911 until the end of the 1980s, the history of Mongolia was closely connected with the Czarist

Empire and its successor, the USSR. Russia supported the Mongols in their desire to secede from the Qing Empire and played the central role in the proclamation of independence, providing them with significant assistance in building statehood.

In a short period, Mongolia emerged from the backward outskirts of the Qing Empire with a population almost on the verge of extinction as an aspiring modern, developed state.^{cxxii} The USSR became Mongolia's loyal ally, sponsor, and guarantor of both territorial integrity and sovereignty. In turn, it must be stated that Mongolia also played an important role in Russian history, having influenced the unification process of the Russian lands during the Middle Ages. The Russians adopted from the Mongol-Tatars the specificities of statehood, military and financial systems, and the methods of diplomacy.^{cxxiii}

In the 20th century, Mongolia's role in foreign policy was significant for the USSR. Mongolia's aid to the Soviet people during the Second World War too was extremely welcome. It served as a buffer between the USSR and the People's Republic of China during their intricate relations, resulting in the Sino-Soviet split. Thus, Mongolia was one of the first foreign countries to express its readiness to help the Soviet Union immediately after the start of World War II; and in certain respects, its various measures of assistance was comparable in principle to that of Lend-Lease.^{cxxiv}

Thus, analysing bilateral relations between Mongolia and Russia, one can conclude that both parties have undertaken much work over the last thirty years. Mongolia and Russia have gone from restoring relations to establishing a strategic partnership. A solid regulatory framework has been created for the development of relations in multiple directions, the practice of regular meetings at a high level has developed, and trade and economic ties continue to progress. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that Russia's influence in Mongolia is incomparable to the Soviet period. Mongolia successfully developed relations with countries such as the United States, Canada, Turkey, and Australia, geographically located at considerable distances from Northeast Asia. Quite naturally, this strategy of Mongolia is conditioned by the concept of a "third neighbour", adopted in opposition to Russia and China.^{cxxv}

President Putin proposed developing a road map for further cooperation to create new industries, stimulate trade and mutual investment, and expand humanitarian contacts.^{cxxvi} Throughout the 2010s, Russia has clearly indicated its desire to strengthen its political, economic and cultural influence in Mongolia. One may term this strategy a possible return to Mongolia. Nevertheless, the emerging situation in the APR, namely the growing military power

of the PRC, a possible reduction in the US presence in the APR, as was repeatedly stated by the Trump Administration, may lead to a re-equilibration of the balance of power in this region, which may not meet the interests of either Mongolia or Russia. Consequently, Mongolia and Russia may need to consider strengthening their cooperation to maintain the balance of power in the region.

References

-
- ⁱ Haining, T. N. (1991). Elevated-by-all!. *Asian Affairs*, 22(2), 167-175.
- ⁱⁱ Mandal, R. (2012). Ch'ing Policies towards Mongols and its Impact on Mongolian National Movement. *Academic Discourse*, 1(2), 17-25.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Dennis, A. L. (1923). Russian Policy in the Far East. *The North American Review*, 217(808), 303-312.
- ^{iv} ELLEMAN, B. A. (1994). SOVIET POLICY ON OUTER MONGOLIA AND THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. *Journal of Asian History*, 28(2), 108-123.
- ^v Kuznetsov, I. I. (1999). The Soviet military advisors in Mongolia 1921–39. *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 12(4), 118-137.
- ^{vi} Halperin, C. J. (1982). Tsarev ulus: Russia in the Golden Horde. *Cahiers du Monde russe et soviétique*, 257-263., Halperin, C. J. (1982). " Know Thy Enemy": Medieval Russian Familiarity with the Mongols of the Golden Horde. *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, (H. 2), 161-175.
- ^{vii} Kamalov, A. (2018). Russkiye konsulstva v Sintsiane (konets XIX–nachalo XX vv.) [Russian consulates in Xinjiang (late XIX–early XX centuries)], 180-183.
- ^{viii} Qurbonovich, O. A. (2019). International Relations in the Far East and Russia in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries. *Indonesian Journal of Innovation Studies*, 5.
- ^{ix} Kurguzov, P.V. (2019). TO THE HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE URGA ORDER OF ATAMAN SEMENOV ON THE TERRITORY OF OUTER MONGOLIA IN 1918 IN THE MODERN WORLD, 288.
- ^x Sizova, A. (2016). The Political Role of the Russian Consulates in Mongolia in the Mongolian National Liberation Movement in the Early 20th Century. *Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP*, 119.
- ^{xi} Garbutt, P. E. (1954). The Trans-Siberian Railway. *The Journal of Transport History*, (4), 238-249.
- ^{xii} Wiren, A. R. (1942). The Lesson of Port Arthur. *Russian Review*, 1(2), 40-43.
- ^{xiii} Tolstoguzov, S. (2016, July). Russian–Japanese relations after the Russo-Japanese war in the context of world politics. In *Japan forum* (Vol. 28, No. 3, pp. 282-298). Routledge.
- ^{xiv} Ewing, T. E. (1980). Ch'ing Policies in Outer Mongolia 1900–1911. *Modern Asian Studies*, 14(1), 145-157.

-
- ^{xv} Lee, C. (2014). From Kitchen to Vladivostok: Russian Merchants and the Tea Trade. *Region: Regional Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia*, 3(2), 195-218.
- ^{xvi} Popova, I. F. (2008). Russian Explorations in Central Asia at the Turn of the 20th Century. St. Petersburg. (Russian Explorations in Central Asia at the Turn of the 20th Century, St Petersburg, 2008. http://www.iop.or.jp/Documents/1727/12_%5B104-126%5DI.F.Popova.pdf 104-126).
- ^{xvii} Kozloff, P. K. (1909). The Mongolia-Sze-Chuan expedition of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society. *The Geographical Journal*, 34(4), 384-408.
- ^{xviii} Dear, D. (2014). Holy Rollers: Monasteries, Lamas, and the Unseen Transport of Chinese–Russian Trade, 1850–1911. *International Review of Social History*, 59(S22), 69-88.
- ^{xix} Bridges, F. (1945). Peace in Mongolia. *Current History*, 9(50), 311-316.
- ^{xx} Basu, S. A. (1978). Mongolia between Russia and China.
- ^{xxi} Hyer, E. A. (2005). Haunted by History: China and Its Northwestern Neighbors. *Historia Actual Online*, (7), 83-92.
- ^{xxii} Boardman, E. P. (1951). Gerard M. Fritters, Outer Mongolia and its international position, tr. by John De Francis Edited by Meribeth E. Cameron and Osamu Shimizu (Book Review). *Journal of Asian Studies*, 10(2), 199.
- ^{xxiii} Wiens, H. J. (1950). Outer Mongolia and Its International Position.
- ^{xxiv} Kozloff, P. K. (1910). The Mongolia-Sze-Chuan expedition of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society. *The Geographical Journal*, 36(3), 288-310.
- ^{xxv} Pestushko, Y. S., & Shulatov, Y. A. (2019). Russo-Japanese Relations from 1905 to 1916: from Enemies to Allies. In *A History of Russo-Japanese Relations* (pp. 101-118). Brill.
- ^{xxvi} Masahiro, H. O. S. H. I. N. O. (2000). A Historical Examination of the Founding of Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region. *CHINA'S BORDERLAND HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY STUDIES.*, Clauson, G. (1956). The case against the Altaic theory. *Central Asiatic Journal*, 181-187.
- ^{xxvii} Síma, J. (1974). On the Character of the So-Called Pan-Mongol Movement After 1911. *Archív Orientální*, 42, 97-119., Bayarkhuu, D. (2001). Mongolia and its Third Neighbours. *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, 5(1), 80.,
- ^{xxviii} Williams, E. T. (1916). The Relations Between China, Russia and Mongolia. *American Journal of International Law*, 10(4), 798-808.,
- ^{xxix} Urangua, J., Kuzmin, Yu.V., Vasilenko, V.A., & Karasev, S.V. (2020). History of world and Russian Mongol studies: national schools, problems, personalities. *Bulletin of the laboratory of ancient technologies*, 16 (3), 188-196.
- ^{xxx} Guzalovich, K. A. The “Mongolian question” to Russian foreign policy. *International Journal on Integrated Education*, 2(6), 67-72.
- ^{xxxi} Maghame, B. (1973). *CHINESE POLICY TOWARD TIBET AND MONGOLIA*. California State University, Fullerton.,
- ^{xxxii} Jianyong, F. (2013). The “political game” and “state-building”: outer Mongolia during the 1911 Revolution. In *China* (pp. 275-293). Routledge.
- ^{xxxiii} Chih-Yi, M. C. (1950). Bibliography of books and articles on Mongolia.,

-
- ^{xxxiv} Spring, D. W. (1979). Russian imperialism in Asia in 1914. *Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique*, 305-322.
- ^{xxxv} Saveliev, I. R., & Pestushko, Y. S. (2001). Dangerous Rapprochement: Russia and Japan in the First World War, 1914–1916. *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, 18, 19-41.
- ^{xxxvi} Síma, J. (1974). On the Character of the So-Called Pan-Mongol Movement After 1911. *Archív Orientální*, 42, 97-119.
- ^{xxxvii} Urbansky, S. (2020). 3. Revolutions without Borders. In *Beyond the Steppe Frontier* (pp. 89-122). Princeton University Press.
- ^{xxxviii} Lepekhov, S. Y. (2013). The Religious Policy of the Russian Government towards Buddhism at the End of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Centuries. *International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture*, 20, 145-161.
- ^{xxxix} Yigit, S. (2020). Tuva, April 1914: Incorporation as a Russian Protectorate. *International Relations and Diplomacy*, 8(07), 281-289.
- ^{xl} Hyer, E. A. (2005). Haunted by History: China and Its Northwestern Neighbors. *Historia Actual Online*, (7), 83-92.
- ^{xli} Valliant, R. B. (1977). Inner Mongolia, 1912: the Failure of Independence. *Mongolian Studies*, 56-92.
- ^{xlii} Chen, T. H. E. (1955). RUSSIA'S FAR EASTERN POLICY. *Current history*, 28(162), 95-102., Strausz-Hupé, R. (1950). MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA: RED AND WHITE IMPERIALISM. *Current History*, 19(108), 73-77.
- ^{xliii} Boikova, E. (2002). Russians in Mongolia in the Late 19 th-Early 20 the Centuries. *Mongolian Studies*, 13-20.
- ^{xliv} Endicott, E. (2012). Agriculture, Mining, Tourism: Competing Interests in Land Use. In *A History of Land Use in Mongolia* (pp. 129-157). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- ^{xliv} Haining, T. N. (1996). The Yak, the Bear and the Dragon: Uneasy Bedfellows. A Cautionary Tale of Russian and Chinese Influences on Mongolian History. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 6(1), 69-79.
- ^{xlvi} Endicott, E. (2005). The Mongols and China: cultural contacts and the changing nature of pastoral nomadism (twelfth to early twentieth centuries). *BRILL'S INNER ASIAN LIBRARY*, 461.
- ^{xlvii} Boikova, E. (2002). Russians in Mongolia in the Late 19 th-Early 20 the Centuries. *Mongolian Studies*, 13-20.
- ^{xlvi} Ewing, T. E. (1981). The Forgotten Frontier: South Siberia (Tuva) in Chinese and Russian History, 1600-1920. *Central Asiatic Journal*, 25(3/4), 174-212.
- ^{xlix} Ewing, T. E. (1978). The Origin of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party: 1920. *Mongolian Studies*, 79-105., Polyanskaya, O. (2014). Professor Władysław L. Kotwicz and the Russian Committee of Central and East Asia Research. *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, (1), Miller, R. J. (1952). A selective survey of literature on Mongolia. *American Political Science Review*, 46(3), 849-866., Ivanov, A. A., Kuras, L. V., Kuras, S. L., & Kuras, T. L. (2020, January). From the History of the Gendarme Police Service Organization on the Trans-Baikal Railway (1899–1917). In *International Session on Factors of Regional Extensive Development (FRED 2019)* (pp. 520-525). Atlantis Press.,

ⁱ Rupen, R. A. (1958). Mongolian nationalism. *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 45(2), 157-178.

ⁱⁱ Nekrylov, S. A. (2014). Russian and international scientific and educational contacts among professors and teachers as a form of organisation for scientific work and the improvement of teaching and research skills (based on the example of Tomsk State University). *History of Medicine*, 3, 78-84.

ⁱⁱⁱ Sizova, A. (2016). The Political Role of the Russian Consulates in Mongolia in the Mongolian National Liberation Movement in the Early 20th Century. Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP, 119.

ⁱⁱⁱⁱ Peshkov, I. (2017). In the shadow of 'frontier disloyalty' at Russia–China–Mongolia border zones. *History and Anthropology*, 28(4), 429-444.

^{liv} Mansvetov, F. S. (1945). Russia and China in Outer Mongolia. *Foreign affairs*, 24(1), 143-152.

^{lv} Sarlagtay, M. O. (2004). Mongolia: Managing transition from nomadic to settled culture. *The Asia-Pacific: A region in transition*, 323-334.

^{lvi} Mongolia's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2001. (n.d.). Retrieved July 31, 2021, from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mongolia_2001.pdf.

^{lvii} Rodionov, V., Aktamov, I., Badaraev, D., Badmatsyrenov, T., Kombaev, A., & Dorzhieva, I. (2016). Foreign powers competition in the mining sector of Mongolia. In *SHS Web of Conferences* (Vol. 28, p. 01137). EDP Sciences.

^{lviii} Severinghaus, S. R. (2001). Mongolia in 2000 the pendulum swings again. *Asian Survey*, 41(1), 61-70.

^{lix} Rozman, G. (2018). The Russian Pivot to Asia. In *International Relations and Asia's Northern Tier* (pp. 13-26). Palgrave, Singapore.

^{lx} Rangsimaporn, P. (2009). Russian perceptions and policies in a multipolar East Asia under Yeltsin and Putin. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 9(2), 207-244.

^{lxi} Pieper, M. (2020). The new silk road heads north: implications of the China-Mongolia-Russia economic corridor for Mongolian agency within Eurasian power shifts. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 1-24.

^{lxii} World Bank. (n.d.). GDP growth (annual %) - Mongolia. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2020&locations=MN&start=1982&view=chart>

^{lxiii} Rodionov, V., Badmatsyrenov, T., Aktamov, I., & Badaraev, D. (2017, June). Economic security of Mongolia in context of Northeast Asia prospects. In *International Conference on Trends of Technologies and Innovations in Economic and Social Studies 2017* (pp. 557-562). Atlantis Press.

^{lxiv} World Bank. (n.d.). Mongolia trade. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from <https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/MNG>

^{lxv} Ganhuyag, E. (2017). RUSSIA-MONGOLIA FROM THE 1990S TO 2016: ON THE WAY OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. *RUDN Journal of Russian History*, 16(3), 462-476.

^{lxvi} Batbayar, T. (2003). Mongolian-Russian relations in the past decade. *Asian Survey*, 43(6), 951-970.

-
- ^{lxxvii} Sneath, D. (2020, October 23). Russia's borders: Mongolia looks to its old Big brother to counterbalance China. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from <https://theconversation.com/russias-borders-mongolia-looks-to-its-old-big-brother-to-counterbalance-china-36721>
- ^{lxxviii} Dzhagaeva, O. A. (2019). SOME PROBLEMS OF SOVIET-MONGOL COOPERATION. Caspian region: politics, economics, culture, (2 (59)), 42-47.
- ^{lxxix} Ganhuyag, E. (2017). RUSSIA-MONGOLIA FROM THE 1990S TO 2016: ON THE WAY OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. RUDN Journal of Russian History, 16(3), 462-476.
- ^{lxxx} Reinert, E. S. (2004). Globalisation in the Periphery as a Morgenthau Plan: The Underdevelopment of Mongolia in the 1990s. Globalisation, economic development and inequality: An alternative perspective, 157-214.
- ^{lxxxi} Batbayar, T. (1994). Mongolia in 1993: a fragile democracy. Asian Survey, 34(1), 41-45.
- ^{lxxxii} Ivanov, I., & Erdenechuluun, L. (2005). Joint Russian-Mongolian Statement. Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, (12), 107-111.
- ^{lxxxiii} Radchenko, S. (2012). Soviet Withdrawal from Mongolia, 1986–1992: A Reassessment. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 25(2), 183-203.
- ^{lxxxiv} Ganhuyag, E. (2017). RUSSIA-MONGOLIA FROM THE 1990S TO 2016: ON THE WAY OF STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP. RUDN Journal of Russian History, 16(3), 462-476.
- ^{lxxxv} Batbayar, T. (2003). Mongolian-Russian relations in the past decade. Asian Survey, 43(6), 951-970.
- ^{lxxxvi} McFaul, M. (2000). Putin in power. Current History, 99(639), 307-314.
- ^{lxxxvii} Severinghaus, S. R. (2001). Mongolia in 2000 the pendulum swings again. Asian Survey, 41(1), 61-70.
- ^{lxxxviii} Trifonova, A.A. (2020). To be remembered. Diplomatic Service, (2), 79-83.
- ^{lxxxix} Krishna, V. (2018). Expanding Vistas of Mongolia-Russia Strategic Partnership since 2000 Ulaanbaatar Declaration. Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, 20, 101-114.
- ^{lxxx} Sumiyabazar, C. (2004). Mongolia: Forgiven—The Mongolian government hails record Russian debt write-off. But was there really anything to be forgiven?. Week in review, 13-19.
- ^{lxxxii} Panda, A. (2016, February 03). Why did Russia just write off 97% of Mongolian debt? Retrieved July 31, 2021, from <https://thediplomat.com/2016/02/why-did-russia-just-write-off-97-of-mongolian-debt/>
- ^{lxxxiii} *ibid.*
- ^{lxxxiiii} Sagaev, N. T., & Dugarov, V. D. (2012). COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND MPR IN EDUCATION AND SCIENCE IN THE XX CENTURY IN THE NATIONAL HISTORIOGRAPHY. Bulletin of the East Siberian State University of Technology/Vestnik VSGTU, 38(3).
- ^{lxxxv} In January 2001, in Davos, the Prime Minister of Mongolia Enkhbayar met with the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Kudrin; in February 2001, Deputy Chairman of the State Great Khural of Mongolia Zhamsran Byam-badorj and Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs Tsendiin Nyamdorj visited Moscow. Also, in February 2001, the 2nd meeting of the working group on the liberalisation of mutual trade was held in Ulaanbaatar. Moreover, cooperation began to be developed through the security councils of the two countries.

^{lxxxv} Batbayar, T. (2003). Foreign policy and domestic reform in Mongolia. *Central Asian Survey*, 22(1), 45-59.

^{lxxxvi} In February 2002, a delegation headed by the Chairman of the State Great Khural of Mongolia Sangzhbegziin Tumur-Ochir paid an official visit to Moscow. During the meetings, Tumur-Ochir spoke about expanding contacts with Russia in culture, education and science. He emphasised that in Mongolia, after a sure decline, there was a growing interest in education in Russia, in the Russian language. In response, a delegation of the State Duma of the Russian Federation was planned to visit Mongolia. Subsequently, meetings of parliamentarians of both countries took place.

^{lxxxvii} Bedeski, R. E. (2006). Mongolia as a Modern Sovereign Nation-State. *Mongolian Journal of International Affairs*, (13), 77-87.

^{lxxxviii} During this visit in October 2000, A.V. Kvashnin - Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the Action Plan for military cooperation between the armed forces of the Russian Federation and Mongolia for 2001 and the Memorandum of Intent between the RF Ministry of Defense and the Mongolian Defense Ministry on the development of cooperation in the military field were signed. In March 2001, a Russian military delegation headed by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces A.S. Skvortsov took part in events dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Armed Forces of Mongolia. On April 15-22, 2001, the Mongolian Defense Minister ZhYgderdemidiin Gurragchi, the first Mongolian cosmonaut, paid an official visit to Moscow.

^{lxxxix} In March 2006, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov paid a working visit to Ulan Bator, and in July 2006, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov paid an official visit to Mongolia. During his talks with his Mongolian counterpart, Miegombyn Enkhbold, serious attention was paid to trade and economic cooperation, including Russia's participation in large investment projects.

^{xc} Graivoronsky, V. V. (2014). Russia's Role in the Exploration and Development of Natural Resources in Contemporary Mongolia. *Inner Asia*, 16(2), 315-335.

^{xci} Shen, Q. (2016). Analysis of Sino-Russia-Magnolia Trade Cooperation Potential: Based on the Perspective of Trade Gravity Model. *J. Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research*, 91.

^{xcii} Bulag, U. E. (2010). Mongolia in 2009: from landlocked to land-linked cosmopolitan. *Asian Survey*, 50(1), 97-103.

^{xciii} Fan, L. (2017). Construction of Russia's "Eurasian Union" and "Economic Corridor among China, Mongolia, and Russia". In *China's Belt and Road Initiatives and Its Neighboring Diplomacy* (pp. 83-107).

^{xciv} Fan, L. (2017). Construction of Russia's "Eurasian Union" and "Economic Corridor among China, Mongolia, and Russia". In *China's Belt and Road Initiatives and Its Neighboring Diplomacy* (pp. 83-107.). Jargalsaikhan, M. (2018). Mongolia's Dilemma: A Politically Linked, Economically Isolated Small Power. In *International Relations and Asia's Northern Tier* (pp. 157-173). Palgrave, Singapore.

^{xcv} Ginsburg, T. (1995). Political reform in Mongolia: between Russia and China. *Asian Survey*, 35(5), 459-471.

^{xcvi} Tsyrempilov, N.V. (2015). Russian-Qing treaties of the 17th-18th centuries And the status of Tibeto-Mongolian Buddhism in the Russian Empire. *Bulletin of the Buryat State University. Pedagogy. Philology. Philosophy*, (7).

-
- ^{xcvii} Campi, A. (2006). The rise of cities in nomadic Mongolia. *Mongols from country to city: Floating boundaries, pastoralism and city life in the Mongol lands*, 21-55.
- ^{xcviii} Wanner, M. (2015). Russian-Chinese Trade-in Kyakhta—Trade Development and Volume Indicators 1727–1861. *Prague Papers on the History of International Relations*, 1, 17-27.
- ^{xcix} Thompstone, S. (1980). Russia's tea traders: a neglected segment of a still neglected entrepreneurial class. *Culture, Theory and Critique*, 24(1), 131-163.
- ^c Sántha, I. (2014). Hungarian Witnesses of Infrastructure Construction in Manchuria (1877–1931): The Case of the Eastern Chinese Railway. *Inner Asia*, 16(1), 152-177.
- ^{ci} Namsaraeva, S. (2014). Border Language: Chinese Pidgin Russian with a Mongolian ‘Accent’. *Inner Asia*, 16(1), 116-138.
- ^{cii} Williams, E. T. (1916). The Relations Between China, Russia and Mongolia. *American Journal of International Law*, 10(4), 798-808.
- ^{ciii} Sanders, A. (1997). Mongolia: Looking to the sea. *Geopolitics*, 2(1), 134-152.
- ^{civ} It should be noted that the instrument of bilateral cooperation branches is the representative offices of the Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Kemerovo regions, the Trans-Baikal Territory, the republics of Buryatia, Altai, Tuva and the city of Moscow, and with Mongol side - consulates general in Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude and Kyzyl, consulate in Elista, as well as the honorary consuls in some Siberian cities.
- ^{cv} Rygzynov, T. S., & Tsydypov, V. E. (2019, August). The role of international infrastructure projects in sustainable social and economic development of the border areas (the case of Russia and Mongolia). In *IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science* (Vol. 320, No. 1, p. 012012). IOP Publishing.
- ^{cvi} Qiang, F., & Bayanjargal, S. (2016). The Study on Trade Policy and Openness of Mongolia: Influences on Trade Flows Between China-Mongolia-Russia (Past and Future). *Chinese Business Review*, 15(5), 249-264.
- ^{cvi} Humphrey, C. (2015). ‘Remote’ areas and minoritized spatial orders at the Russia–Mongolia border. *Études mongoles et sibériennes, centrasiatiques et tibétaines*, (46).
- ^{cvi} Otgonsaikhan, N. (2015). The Current Situation for Mongolian Foreign Trade and Cooperation with Northeast Asian Countries. *ERINA REPORT*, 8.
- ^{cix} Among the Russian regions, the Republic of Buryatia ranks 6th in the volume of exports to Mongolia.
- ^{cx} Gantuya, D., Imideeva, I., Badaraeva, R., Badaraev, T., Aiyzhy, E., & Likhtan, V. (2018). Economy of The Central Asia Region in Conditions Of Globalization (On The Example Of The Republic Of Buryatia, Tuva And Mongolia. *International Journal of Management and Business Research*, 8(3), 12.
- ^{cix} Sanders, A. (1997). Mongolia: Looking to the sea. *Geopolitics*, 2(1), 134-152.
- ^{cx} In January 2018, at the invitation of the Mayor of Ulaanbaatar, Sundin Batbold, the Inter-parliamentary group of the State Great Khural (VGH) of Mongolia "Russia - Mongolia", with the assistance of the National Trade and Industrialists of Mongolia (NCCI), made a visit with a delegation of businessmen to the Republic of Buryatia. The leadership of the Head of the Republic of Buryatia, Tsydenov, participated in the business conference "Investment potential of the Republic of Buryatia". The business conference was attended by the Ambassador of Russia to Mongolia, Azizov, Deputy Chairman of the Interparliamentary Group "Russia - Mongolia", from the State Great Khural (VGH) of Mongolia Byambasurengiin Ankh-Amgalan,

President of the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Mongolia Baatarzhavin Lhagwazhav and many others. About 700 people participated in the events, representing more than 40 companies of the Republic of Buryatia, more than 30 companies of Mongolia, and various research institutes of China, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea and Germany. The following issues were discussed: supplying electricity to Mongolia, organising transit rail and road transport, developing medical cooperation, tourism, meat supplies from Mongolia.

During the visit, meetings took place between the Head of the Republic of Buryatia, Tsydenov with the President of Mongolia Battulga, Chairman of the Government of Mongolia Ukhnaagiin Khurelsu-khom, Vice-Speaker of the State Great Khural of Mongolia Luvsantseren, members of the Russia-Mongolia Inter-Parliamentary Group, and also Mayor of Ulaanbaatar, Batbold. In April 2018, a delegation of the People's Khural (NH) of the Republic of Buryatia, headed by the Chairman of the National Economy of the Republic of Buryatia, Dorzhiev, visited Mongolia. The deputies got acquainted with the work of the APU group of companies, visited several enterprises, discussed issues of investment cooperation. From 10 to 11 May 2018, a business conference was held in Ulan-Ude for the Republic of Buryatia and Mongolia business people. As part of the event, the Republic heads of approximately 170 companies in Ulaanbaatar visited Buryatia and the aimags of Mongolia working in the field of food, light industry, energy, transport, construction and agriculture. The delegation of Mongolia was headed by a member of the State Great Khural of Mongolia, Chairman, Oyundar, the Secretary of State Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry of Mongolia, Enkhbat and the Secretary-General of the National Trade and Industry of Mongolia, Oyuuntagsh. Presentations of the economic potential of Mongolia and the Republic were held in Buryatia, meetings of entrepreneurs were organised in the following sections: agro-industrial complexes, transport and logistics complex, industry, medical health and tourism. Also, entrepreneurs of Buryatia and Mongolia held negotiations in a business to business (b2b) format, they made presentations of their enterprises and projects, visited industrial enterprises and organisations of the Republic of Buryatia, including a plywood mill, Baikal fish factory, Selenge factory, confectionery workshop, an enterprise for the installation of automatic gates, "Azgur Tex" a company producing children's knitwear, sports and homeware and hosiery, "Razvivayka", which produces toys and modules, as well as the Buryat Scientific Research Institute of Agriculture. From 7 to 9 June 2018, the delegation of the Republic of Buryatia, led by Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Republic of Buryatia for Economic Development, Zuraev, took part in the forum "Russian-Mongolia 2018" in Ulaanbaatar. The delegation included trade representatives from the Chamber of Industry of the Republic of Buryatia, Export Center of Buryatia, Fund supporting small businesses and agro-industrial companies.

Within the forum's framework, an exhibition was held with the participation of advanced technologies, equipment products and products of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs in Russia, including from the Republic of Buryatia. Pre-business representatives of the Republic made presentations of their companies and products for Mongolian business people and Mongolian buyers. A workshop "Berezka" was held in Ulan-Ude tasting a line of new cakes produced in Buryatia presented juices, syrups, sea buckthorn jams, herbal teas from Chaga and polymer paving slabs. Following the exhibition, contracts for the supply of manufactured goods in the Republic of Buryatia to Mongolia, negotiations were held with network trading companies about the possibility of supplying food products to Mongolia. At the invitation of the Minister of Food, Agriculture state and light industry of Mongolia, Batzorig, a delegation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food in the Republic of Buryatia in June 2018 participated in the VIII International Meeting of the Multilateral Partnership on the Global Noah program of sustainable development of animal husbandry in Ulaanbaatar. Within the meeting framework, discussions concerning the supply of meat from Mongolia to the Republic of

Buryatia, breeding animals, seedlings, seeds, food products from the Republic of Buryatia in Mongolia, organising fairs and exhibitions of Russian and Mongolian goods took place. In the period from 13 to 16 April 2018 in Irkutsk with the participation of a representative of the Republic of Buryatia, a meeting of the Russian-Mongolian working subgroup scientific support for the development of materials for careful consideration of issues related to the planned construction in Mongolia hydraulic structures in the catchment area of the Selenga took place. At the meeting of the working subgroup, proposals for revision were considered for the districts of Selenga and Lake Baikal in the context of the Shurenkaya hydropower plant construction project and Orkhon hydropower and drainage development projects. According to the meeting results, the parties expressed their readiness to continue discussing projects of hydro-technical structures planned on the Selenga River and its tributaries.

In December 2018, the Regional Development Fund of the Republic of Buryatia in Ulan-Ude held a business conference, "Investor's Day in the Republic of Buryatia", which was attended by entrepreneurs from Mongolia. Concerning regional development with the Republic of Buryatia, negotiations were held with a Mongolian company, APU, on opening a representative office in Buryatia, the establishment of excise warehouse and temporary storage warehouse (TSW). Also, negotiations were held with the Mongolian company TESO on constructing the Teso pasta factory in Buryatia. Work began selecting land plots and premises for the construction or placement of a pasta factory, taking into account the requirements for production. The Regional Development Fund of the Republic of Buryatia focused on implementing the project creation of a cargo handling centre for e-commerce with the involvement of the Mongolian side. In the period 28-29 March 2019 in the Republic of Buryatia, further talks on cooperation between small and medium-sized businesses of Russia and Mongolia, a Russian-Mongolian business mission was held. The Mongolian delegation was actively attended by representatives of various ministries and departments, business communities carrying out tourism, construction, transport and logistics, fish and farming activities.

As part of the Russian-Mongolian business mission, an exhibition fair was held for Mongolian and Russian goods "Baikaltrade 2019", presentations of organisations; business representatives, business contacts exchange and work in sections in the areas of the agro-industrial complex, construction, transport, logistics. Mongolian entrepreneurs visited agricultural enterprises of the Republic, including an industrial park, a jade processing factory, and received advice on compliance with veterinary and phytosanitary supervision requirements. In May 2019, the organisations of the Republic of Buryatia: Ulan-Ude poultry factory, art studio "Dombo", innovative enterprise "Baikaliya", a chain of stores "Uniform" and others, took part in the International Exhibition of Export and Import Products in Ulaanbaatar. Negotiations with Mongolian companies took place; an agreement was reached on establishing partnerships. As part of the expansion of trade and economic relations of the Republic of Buryatia with Mongolia in the field of agro-industrial complex, the promising directions of cooperation areas are:- expanding the supply of food products from the Republic of Buryatia, Russian Federation to Mongolia;- supplies of breeding material from the Republic of Buryatia to the Russian Federation, walkie-talkies to Mongolia; activation of cooperation between authorised bodies on the issue of lifting restrictions on the import of beef on bones from Mongolia to the Russian Federation; holding an exhibition and fair events in the territories of the Russian Federation and Mongolia; organisation of joint ventures on the territory of the Republic of Buryatia.

^{cxii} Khachatryan, N., Schuele, H., Malakshinova, I., & Khachatryan, A. "Chicken and Egg" Problem in the Meat Sector of Buryatia.

-
- ^{cxiii} Biltuev, S., Achituev, V., & Zhamyanov, B. (2019, November). Feeding capacity and meat productivity of sheep of different breeds in the Republic of Buryatia. In IOP Conference Series: Earth and Environmental Science (Vol. 395, No. 1, p. 012115). IOP Publishing.
- ^{cxiv} Bouchemla, F., Agoltsov, V. A., Popova, O. M., & Padilo, L. P. (2018). Assessment of the peste des petits ruminants world epizootic situation and estimate its spreading to Russia. *Veterinary World*, 11(5), 612.
- ^{cxv} Dulguun, A. (2020). To the development of the free economic zone of Mongolia Altanbulag. *RSUH/RGGU BULLETIN. Series Economics. Management. Law*.
- ^{cxvi} Kuklina, M. V., Krasnoshtanova, N. E., Trufanov, A. I., Bogdanov, V. N., & Erdinieva, S. N. (2021). Border area tourism with problems and prospective: RF-Mongolia. In *E3S Web of Conferences* (Vol. 284, p. 10003). EDP Sciences.
- ^{cxvii} Potaev, V., Atanov, N., Subanakov, G., & Tsyrenov, D. (2020). The Russian-Mongolian border zone: a study of the current status and development challenges at the municipal level. *Revista Inclusions*, 12-19.
- ^{cxviii} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (n.d.) Foreign Minister SERGEY Lavrov's remarks at a joint news conference following talks with Foreign Minister of Mongolia Batmunkh Battsetseg, Moscow, JUNE 1,2021. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4759892
- ^{cxix} *ibid.*
- ^{cxx} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (n.d.) Foreign Minister SERGEY LAVROV'S address on RUSSIA'S International activities for Russian Regions' development, delivered at Far Eastern Federal UNIVERSITY (FEFU), and answers to questions from students and Faculty, Vladivostok, July 8, 2021. Retrieved July 31, 2021, from https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4809543
- ^{cxxi} *ibid.*
- ^{cxxii} Constant, F. (2019). The Legal Administration of Qing Mongolia. *Late Imperial China*, 40(1), 133-173.
- ^{cxxiii} Miyawaki, J. (1992). The Chinggisid Principle in Russia. *Russian History*, 19(1/4), 261-277.
- ^{cxxiv} Sanders, A. J. (1974). Mongolia: From Sambuu to Tsendenbal. *Asian Survey*, 971-984.
- ^{cxxv} Bayarkhuu, D. (2001). Mongolia and its Third Neighbours. *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, 5(1), 80.
- ^{cxxvi} Fan, L. (2017). Construction of Russia's "Eurasian Union" and "Economic Corridor among China, Mongolia, and Russia". In *China's Belt and Road Initiatives and Its Neighboring Diplomacy* (pp. 83-107).